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 ABSTRACT  
 
This study examines the impact of the EU’s trade policy on the integrity of 
SACU in the context of the EPA negotiations, which is expected to be signed in 
early-mid 2009. To this end, it analyses the policy leverage (i.e. conditionality, 
issue-linkage and sanctioning) exerted by the EU on SACU countries towards 
signing onto the EPA. It also examines the intra-SACU arrangements between 
on the one hand, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland (BLNS), and on the 
other, South Africa which brings into perspective the highly unequal levels of 
economic size and level of development. The study posits that in a trade 
negotiation with a dominant trading partner, smaller countries will face much 
higher opportunity costs than medium-sized countries, in which case smaller 
states will accept the terms of a more dominant trading power much easier than 
medium-sized states. Overall, the study concludes that South Africa’s 
unwillingness to sign onto the EPA alongside its SACU partners is a product of 
insufficient pressure on the part of the EU and differing domestic and regional 
interests to those of the BLNS. 
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INT R ODUC T ION 
The European Union (EU) and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries have a long history of development cooperation. This has proceeded 
through various phases, beginning with the Yaoundé Conventions (1963-1974), 
followed by the four Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) and the current Cotonou 
Agreement. These frameworks for cooperation have contained unique features 
of the broader field of North-South cooperation such as trade and development. 
In terms of trade provisions, the EU has granted ACP countries with unilateral 
non-reciprocal trade preferences in order to encourage these countries to 
diversify and increase exports. However, the results of these trade preferences 
offered under the Lomé Convention to a large extent were disappointing as the 
ACP states’ share of exports to the EU declined steadily from 6.7 percent in 
1976 to 2.8 percent by 1994.1 At the same time, there were substantial changes 
in the external environment relating to the global trading system, globalisation 
and trade liberalisation. The conjunction of these factors led to a reassessment 
of the EU’s development approach which led to the signing of the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2000. The new Agreement represents a major break with the non-
reciprocal preferences of the past meaning that trade preferences will be 
applied by both the EU and the ACP countries, thereby ending the one sided 
application by the EU of the Lomé Convention trade provisions. In terms of the 
Cotonou Agreement, non-reciprocal trade preferences should have been 
replaced by reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), between 
different ACP groupings and the EU by 31 December 2007. 
According to the Cotonou Agreement, poverty reduction and integration into the 
world economy are the main objectives of EPAs. As policy analysts have 
emphasised a positive correlation between trade and development, it comes as 
no surprise that the EU has seen trade as a prime instrument for development. 
The EU maintains that this objective is best served by EPAs which would inter 
alia, support regional integration. The EU has a clear preference for negotiating 
                                            
1 Hurt, S. “Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union 
and the ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention” in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 
1, February 2003, p. 165. 
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EPAs on existing integration efforts, which have been characterised by weak 
capabilities and institutional weakness. The Southern African Customs Union2 
(SACU) is considered to be the most stable, coherent and prominent economic 
grouping in Africa and has undertaken significant liberalisation commitments 
vis-à-vis the EU. In the context of the EPA negotiations with the EU, four of the 
five members of SACU have pressed ahead to deepen integration with the EU, 
while South Africa has remained reluctant to follow. These developments have 
produced major divisions in SACU, thereby threatening to dissolve the world’s 
oldest customs union (SACU). It is within this context that the research report 
will seek to assess the impact of the EU’s trade policy on the integrity of SACU. 
Even though the BLNS and South Africa form part of the same customs union 
(SACU), the former and latter hold very divergent views regarding economic 
policy vis-à-vis the EU. At the same time, given the wide developmental gaps 
between SACU members, the EU also differentiates between South Africa and 
the BLNS in terms of economic policy. For these reasons, the research report 
will separately assess the EU’s trade policy toward, on the one hand, South 
Africa, on the other, the BLNS.  
In order to understand the extent to which the EU’s trade policy has threatened 
to undermine SACU, the research report will examine the strategic interaction 
(power) within which the EPA negotiations have taken place. As the behaviour 
of states can be considered a function of the distribution of power within a 
system, a structural approach will enable the research report to examine the 
function of constraints and choice in bringing the initial divergent positions of 
actors into convergence. For instance, the BLNS, were at first hesitant to initial 
the EPAs, however subsequently initialled out of fear of losing out on EU aid 
and market access as the end of 2007 was approaching. By contrast, South 
Africa has resisted pressure on the part of the EU to initial the EPAs and has 
argued that such a move would undermine its national interests. This raises 
important questions such as: to what extent is the choice of initialling EPAs with 
the EU informed by power and dependence? Has the EU manipulated the 
                                            
2 SACU is formed by Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland (BLNS), as well as South Africa 
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opportunity costs of the BLNS, thereby compelling them to initial EPAs? In 
addressing these questions, the research report will examine the link between 
underlying power capabilities and ability to influence policy outcome.  
This research question is important as it examines costs and benefits 
associated with small countries’ accession to discriminatory trade arrangements 
with much larger countries. In theory it is assumed that the benefits of openness 
are inversely related to size. In other words, small countries should receive 
disproportionately more trade flows than larger countries within the context of 
reciprocal liberalisation. However, economic openness is no longer limited to 
trade flows, but includes trade in services, trade related disciplines and new 
issues, which pose a serious policy challenge to weaker states. Therefore, the 
focus on power and inequality between the EU and SACU countries, will allow 
the research report to examine the extent to which relative power capabilities 
affect the distribution of gains. 
The analytical foundations of this world view are provided by theories on 
international regimes and cooperation. Theories of international regimes have 
been selected as most appropriate for this research report as these provide a 
political framework within which international economic processes occur, 
thereby allowing a link to be forged between international economics and 
politics. As was indicated above, cooperation between the EU and ACP 
countries has been characterised by increasingly complex collaboration that has 
involved institutional collaboration on different topics and issues. This condition 
of “complex interdependence” involves the adjustment of policies on the part of 
actors through a process of policy coordination. This process of collaboration or 
policy coordination forms the core concept of regime theory. Regimes are 
defined as norms, rules, and procedures around which actor’s expectations 
converge in a certain issue-area.  
The literature on regime theory can be grouped in a number of categories, 
namely, structural, modified structural (game theoretic), functional, and 
cognitive. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, but overlap in certain 
instances in explaining aspects of collaboration. However there are fundamental 
12 
 
differences in the underlying assumptions of some of these approaches. The 
main cleavage that cuts across the above approaches emerges between the 
“structural” approach and the “cognitive approach”. The former stresses the role 
of power and the distribution of power in the international system, whereby state 
behaviour is a function of international conditions (i.e. the distribution of power). 
The latter stresses the pervasive characteristic of the international system, 
thereby arguing that changes can occur regardless of the structure and 
hierarchy of power in the international system.  
The structural approach accounts for the behaviour of states on the basis of 
differing distributions of power among states. For structuralists, the nature of 
international regimes is determined by the distribution of power among states 
which leads to the inference that regimes have little or no impact.3 Such 
emphasis of power leads to the reasoning that as the power of states changes, 
there will be a concomitant change in the rules that comprise international 
regimes.4 This is consistent with the theory of hegemonic stability which 
emphasises the importance of hegemony and leadership in the international 
political economy. One of its major proponents, Kindleberger has argued that a 
hegemonic power will undertake to provide leadership, thereby making 
interstate relations more stable.5 Even though the concept of hegemony, 
defined in terms of attributing a decline in international economic regimes to 
eroding hegemony appears ambiguous, certain elements of this theory provides 
insight into the preferences and incentives of hegemonic powers. For instance 
Krasner argues that the structure of international trade (the degree of openness 
for movement of goods) will be contingent on potential economic power. For 
Krasner, a hegemonic distribution of economic power will lead to a more open 
                                            
3 Krasner, S., “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables” 
in International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, p. 190. 
4 Keohane, R., and Nye, J. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston, 1977, p. 43. 
5 Kindleberger, C., “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, 
Public Goods, and Free Rides” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 1981, p. 
242-247. 
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trading system as relatively large states will find that their political power will be 
enhanced by a more open economic system.6  
By contrast, in Transforming International Regimes, What the Third World 
Wants and Why, Krasner argues that as the international system is 
characterised by asymmetrical economic interdependence, whereby weaker 
states have been unable to influence international behaviour on the basis of 
national power capabilities, these states have perceived regime change to be 
the only source for potentially increasing their economic and political power.7 In 
other words, by changing norms, rules and procedures which govern the 
movement of goods and factors of production in the international economy, the 
Third World can ameliorate the effects of inherent weak national power 
capabilities and domestic political structures.8  
Although the main focus of this research report is not on regimes, theories of 
international regimes can provide useful insight into the constraints and 
opportunities faced by actors which is contingent on relative economic strength. 
These also demonstrate that asymmetries of power or dependency relations are 
inherent in the structure of the international system, which largely determines 
international behaviour and negotiation outcomes. The analytical foundations of 
this worldview provide a strong basis for analysing the relationship between 
unequal or asymmetric parties. This has broad relevance in the context of 
North-South relations, especially in economic relations and trade agreements. 
In this regard, the most publicised aspects of trade and development (i.e. trade 
liberalisation and integration into the global economy) have depicted the South 
to be a coherent entity pursuing similar objectives, such as the call for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). When looking closer however, it appears 
that developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) have been 
severely constrained in acting jointly toward bringing about fundamental 
changes in the international economic system. The most important of these 
                                            
6 Krasner, S., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade” in World Politics, Vol. 28, 
No. 3, April 1976, p. 317-320. 
7 Krasner, S., “Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why” in 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1981, p. 119-121. 
8 Ibid, p. 122. 
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changes relate to influencing the debate over the new consensus on 
development, elements of which are reflected in the Washington Consensus.  
The most notable debates within this literature arise in certain aspects of 
economic development which are relevant to the research report, such as the 
degree of openness vis-à-vis the international economy and the degree of state 
intervention in the market.    
The research report aims to reinforce this view by indicating that developing 
countries and LDCs have found it extremely difficult to adopt common positions 
in trade negotiations vis-à-vis developed countries in the context of bilateral 
trade agreements. The corollary of this is that there emerges to be a growing 
separation within the South which casts a shadow over the vision of South-
South co-operation and ultimately blurs the conceptualisation of a North-South 
divide. This is illustrated by the split over the signing of the Interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement (IEPA) between South Africa and the BLNS vis-à-vis the 
EU. On the one hand, South Africa has pursued institutionalised forms of 
regional co-operation through SACU and the broader Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), but on the other, has found it increasingly 
expensive in maintaining institutional frameworks of co-operation like SACU.  
In assessing the impact of the EU’s trade policy on the integrity of SACU, the 
research report will examine the two selected case studies9 of South Africa and 
the BLNS and the treatment accorded to these actors on the part of the EU 
respectively. As the EU insists of treating South Africa differently to the BLNS in 
the context of the EPA negotiations, this would mean that internal border 
controls would have to be maintained in order to enforce the different rules of 
origin which ultimately undermines the integrity of SACU and its Common 
External Tariff (CET). A CET is one of the essential characteristics of a customs 
union, without which SACU may become unrecognisable as a customs union.10 
The EU has been willing to align both trade regimes which would ameliorate 
such an outcome, but has made this contingent on South Africa’s accession to 
                                            
9 As Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) constitute a uniform group, these will 
be treated as a single case study 
10 Viner, J. The Customs Union Issue, New York, Lancaster Press, 1950, p. 5. 
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a full EPA. For South Africa this has been a contentious issue as such a move 
entails acquiescing to “behind-the-border” issues, which have become 
increasingly prominent in the new EU trade strategy. This relates to undertaking 
liberalisation in services, competition, investment, government procurement, 
etc. In considering the impact of the EPA on the future of SACU, it will also be 
important to review the relationship amongst SACU member states with respect 
to revenue distribution and institutional arrangements. In terms of revenue 
distribution, the National Budget Review 2008 of the South African Department 
of National Treasury indicates that SACU payments in the first nine months of 
2007 amounted to 1.1 per cent of GDP.11 Under the new Agreement, South 
Africa contributes about 92 per cent to the SACU GDP, but retains only about 
52 per cent of the revenue pool.12 As South Africa’s net costs exceed its net 
benefits in participating in this arrangement, it comes as no surprise that the 
treasury has been increasingly uncomfortable with the revised revenue-sharing 
formula in the new SACU Agreement of 2002.  
Therefore in assessing the impact of the EPA on the coherence of SACU, any 
analysis would be incomplete without considering South Africa’s position within 
SACU and its approach toward the broader Southern Africa region. This can 
also be considered an important factor influencing the strategic choice faced by 
South Africa in the context of the EPA negotiations, which ultimately involves 
having to reconcile between on the one hand, national and domestic interests 
(i.e. a cost/benefit analysis of acquiescing to “behind-the-border” measures in 
the context of the EPA), and on the other, preserving the integrity of SACU (i.e. 
a cost/benefit analysis of aligning both tariff regimes and maintaining the current 
revenue sharing arrangement) and enhancing broader regional co-operation 
efforts. For instance as SACU is circumscribed within the broader SADC, it is 
seen as a potential building block for deeper integration within SADC.  
                                            
11 South African Department of National Treasury, Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2007, 
30 October 2007, p. 21, available from: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2008/mtbps/Chapter%202.pdf, accessed 29 
November 2008. 
12 McCarthy, C., (1) “The Southern African Customs Union in Transition” in African Affairs, Vol. 
102, 2003, p. 627. 
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Such aspirations for deeper integration are confirmed by the launch of the 
SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) in August 2008 and an ambitious plan to evolve 
this arrangement to a customs union by 2010, which critics maintain will be 
impossible due to numerous issues, amongst which are decisions relating to the 
EPA negotiations.13 A SADC customs union would in de facto mean a merger 
between SACU and SADC as a CET would need to be adopted, which seems 
most unlikely as SADC members are undertaking different commitments in the 
EPAs vis-à-vis the EU. By virtue of South Africa’s position in SACU, the latter 
has undertaken significant tariff reductions toward SADC since the SADC 
Protocol on trade came into force in 2000; all imports now enter duty-free, 
excluding motor vehicles and respective parts, and used clothing.14 This 
highlights not only SACU’s important role as a potential precursor toward 
deeper regional integration, but also South Africa’s dominant position within 
SACU and the respective implications for future regional co-operation in the 
region. As a corollary, the choices that South Africa is faced within the context 
of the EPA negotiations will directly influence not only the future of SACU, but 
any deeper integration efforts within the region and beyond. This brings into 
perspective the indirect impact of the EU’s trade policy on SACU and the 
broader region, which is induced through South Africa.  
In terms of the case studies selected, the BLNS can be considered “typical” of a 
class of cases; they all form part of the same customs union, all are 
economically reliant on South Africa, and all have initialled interim EPAs, as the 
non-reciprocal Lomé preferences have expired at the end of 2007. By contrast, 
South Africa also forms part of the same customs union, but can be considered 
a “deviant” or “outlier” case, as it is by far much more developed than the BLNS 
and has its own trade agreement with the EU since 1999.  
                                            
13 Stevens, C., “A Tangled Web: Factionalism over EPAs reveals SADC fault lines” in Trade 
Winds, Vol. 2, No. 1, November 2008, p. 9.  
14 Kruger, P. The Impact of the SADC FTA on intra-regional trade, Tralac, 28 August 2008, 
available from: http://givengain.com/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=1694&news_id=51493&cat_id=1030, 
accessed 1 December 2008 
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The following chapter provides a detailed analysis of key theoretical insight 
which has informed the formulation of this study. It also provides a clear 
analytical framework by contextualising the study within clearly defined 
variables. Chapter 2 provides a background to SACU by considering the 
intergovernmental co-operation amongst members and highlighting South 
Africa’s dominant role in terms of decision making. This part provides insight 
into the essential characteristics of a customs union and essentially defines the 
variance in the dependent variable, which is an important precondition for 
understanding the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 considers the shift in the 
EU’s trade policy toward reciprocal trade relations and policy instruments 
through which it has been able to gain political acceptance of such policies on 
the part of Southern African countries. The final chapter considers the EPA 
negotiation process between on the one hand, the BLNS and South Africa, and 
on the other, the EU.  
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C HAP T E R  1 UNDE R S T ANDING  T HE  T HE OR Y  B E HIND T R ADE  
NE G OT IAT IONS  
1.1 Introduc tion 
The trade negotiations between the EU and countries in Southern Africa are 
essentially about the conclusion over the EPAs, which are seen to be 
developmental strategies to help integrate these countries better in the 
international economy. To this end, the debates surrounding the content over 
the EPAs embody core elements of the developmental literature such as 
economic openness to trade and degree of state intervention in the market. At 
the one end, larger and more developed countries, in this case the EU, have a 
clear preference for economic openness and trade liberalisation with minimal 
government intervention as a key to stimulating economic growth and creating 
the preconditions for economic prosperity. At the other end of the spectrum, 
weaker countries that are latecomers to industrialisation see trade liberalisation 
as an important precondition, yet not an exclusive precondition in fostering 
economic development. For instance, from the perspective of the ACP, in order 
for these countries to maximise the benefits of open markets, the role of the 
state is essential in developing the capacity to internalise the benefits of more 
open trade (i.e. strengthening of infrastructure and building institutions).15 The 
rationale for constructing or reforming trade regimes along the lines of the 
neoliberal model is well captured by both theories of realism and liberalism. 
1.2 T heoretic al F ramework 
Realism on the one hand, accords a central role to state power and the 
distribution of power amongst states. From this perspective the behaviour of 
states is informed purely by egoistic self-interest in maximising utility without 
regard for the utility of another party. Therefore state behaviour is considered to 
                                            
15 Bilal, S., and Rampa, F. Alternative (to) EPAs: Possible scenarios for the future ACP trade 
relations with the EU, ECDPM, Maastricht, February 2006, p. 47. 
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be purely a function of the power distribution within the system.16 To this end, 
decisions over economic policy (i.e. a more open or closed economy) are 
informed purely by egoistic self-interest calculations in serving particular state 
interests to enhance state power.17 Realist theory would predict that the 
decisions of the EU to seek reciprocal trade relations and more open trade with 
ACP countries are purely informed by its self-interests which does not account 
for the utility function of the ACP countries. 
On the other hand, the liberal response to the behaviour of states would 
downplay the diverging interests of states and would explain that state power is 
a response to “failures” in markets of responding to problems of collective 
action. In this context, state power is considered an optimal response to 
enhance global welfare and promote joint maximisation of gains.18  This position 
is consistent with classical approaches to political economy, particularly the 
work of Adam Smith and the provision of public goods.19 Although Smith 
recognises that that “the invisible hand” best organises the attainment of 
society’s capital stock toward developing social wealth, the state has a 
minimalist role in providing certain public goods (i.e. protecting society from 
violence, injustice; and  maintaining certain public goods and institutions).20 In 
other words, state power is a function of attaining the common good by 
providing the preconditions for furthering society’s general interests.21 One 
particular liberalist theory which is consistent with employing state power for the 
attainment of the common good is the hegemonic stability thesis, which sees an 
enlightened hegemon providing the public good of a steady market and 
providing liquidity when the international monetary system is in distress.22  
According to liberal theory, open markets and free trade can be considered 
                                            
16 Krasner, S., “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables” in 
International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, p. 498. 
17 Locit. 
18 Haggard, S., and Simmons, B. “Theories of international regimes”, in International 
Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987, p. 509. 
19 Caporaso, J., and Levine, D. Theories of Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005, p. 44. 
20 Locit. 
21 Krasner, S., (1) op.Cit, p. 197. 
22 Kindleberger, C., op. Cit, p. 247. 
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public goods which further the interests of all parties. The rationale for more 
open markets   has its foundation in the neoliberal model which supports the 
free market, ensures a more competitive environment and takes advantage of 
economies of scale. One of the most debated issues in international political 
economy has been over the idea that intervention in markets is inefficient. From 
a neoliberal perspective, governments are not able to intervene efficiently and 
the latter should have a minimalist role in the functioning of the market.23 The 
neoliberal approach provides the foundations for a global economic system 
characterised by a shift towards free trade, open markets, unrestricted capital 
mobility and harmonised institutions. This is achieved by urging governments, 
especially in developing countries to adopt an elaborate agenda of privatisation 
and liberalisation, which has been the linchpin of the EPA provisions.24 
The task of this research proposal is to examine the political process through 
which actors’ preferences are brought into convergence in the context of a 
negotiation process. To do this end, theories of international regimes provide 
useful insight in explaining co-operation amongst actors in trade relations for the 
reason that the starting premise of conceptualising regimes can not only be 
undergirded by the core theories of international political economy such as 
realism and liberalism as highlighted above, but allow for the incorporation of 
systemic level analysis. In other words, instead of accounting for outcomes 
based solely on actors’ self interests and power which is the basic realist 
premise, or a more liberal perspective that sees outcomes as a function beyond 
the calculations of self-interest, a systemic level analysis focuses on 
environmental factors in explaining outcomes, such as the competitiveness of 
markets for instance.25 In analysing trade relations, in particular why states seek 
to co-operate, such approach can move beyond liberal and mercantilist 
assumptions of trade to a focus on choice within the negotiation process.  
                                            
23 Nayyar, D., “Globalisation and Development Strategies” in Toye, J (ed.), Trade and 
Development Directions for the 21st Century, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., Massachusetts, 
2003, p. 41. 
24 Loc cit. 
25 Keohane, R., “The demand for international regimes” in International Organization, Vol. 36, 
No. 2, Spring 1982, p. 328. 
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As the process by which divergent positions are reconciled involves decisions 
on the part of actors, theories on international regimes and negotiation such as 
rational-choice theory, attribute a strong degree of rationality to the decision 
makers by focusing on choices as a means of arriving at an end result. In this 
regard rational-choice theory assumes that actors and decision makers act 
rationally and make choices in the context of constraints and decision making.26 
This approach allows an examination of the convergence process by focusing 
on voluntary choices as a means of arriving at the end result, but at the same 
time underscoring that choices are voluntary in the context of constraints and 
decision making. When considering the extent to which decision or action is 
“voluntary”, it is important to consider these two important aspects that set the 
parameters within the structural realist context, thereby remaining sensitive to 
the role of power and inequality.27 Constraints can be imposed by powerful 
actors in the context of negotiations through a manipulation of opportunity costs 
for instance; this can ultimately force the weaker party to make decisions within 
constraints that gives greater preference to the more powerful actors.28 As more 
powerful actors are able to manipulate incentives and alter the opportunity costs 
of weaker actors by compelling them to behave in a desired way, such 
manipulation of incentives can be considered a de facto imposed form of co-
operation.29 Therefore the process of policy convergence among actors or the 
reconciling of interests can be understood as a process of choice in the context 
of constrains and decision making, whereby weaker actors may be impaired to 
make autonomous choices.  
To this end, game theoretic approaches, such as the well known game of 
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) provides important insight into the strategic interaction 
between actors by showing that under certain restrictive conditions, the choice 
of actors may be constrained in such a way, in which greater preference is 
given to the more dominant actor. In this instance weaker actors will find it 
                                            
26 Ibid, p. 330. 
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Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, p. 71. 
28 Keohane, R., (1) op. Cit, p. 330. 
29 Young, O., “Regimes Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes” in International 
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within their interest to cooperate and enter into an agreement with a more 
dominant actor. 
Although this exemplifies a de facto imposed form of cooperation, the literature 
contends that as long as actors are collaborating to realise joint gains, it is co-
operation by definition.30 Co-operation defined in this way not only underscores 
the asymmetrical power relations amongst actors in influencing outcomes,  but 
more importantly the fact that outcomes are affected by the opportunity costs 
faced by actors. In other words the bargaining outcome will be affected by the 
relative opportunity cost to actors of forgoing an agreement. Nye and Keohane 
refer to this as “asymmetrical interdependence”.31   In such conditions, 
asymmetrical interdependence can be considered a source of power as any 
changes in the relationship between two actors (which change may be affected 
by the dominant actor), will be more costly to the weaker actor than to the more 
dominant actor. For instance Hirschman indicates that in international trade, in 
line with the neoclassical assumption of welfare benefits, despite that both 
actors gain from a trade relationship, these gains can make one actor 
dependent on the other.32  In trade relations between a small (A) and large 
country (B), the small country will most likely carry a greater portion of its trade 
with B, as opposed to the other way around. Therefore A will be much more 
important to B, than the opposite.33   
In determining the mutual dependence of actors in an agreement it is important 
to refer to the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability. The former relates to the 
perceived effects of policy changes to societies or governments, whereas the 
latter relates to the ability of actors to adjust to policy changes; in other words 
the ability to make alternative agreements if the initial agreement breaks 
down.34 An example of sensitivity dependence in the relations between the EU 
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Weaknesses” in World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1992, p. 470. 
31 Keohane, R., and Nye, J., op.Cit, p. 11. 
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33 Loc cit. 
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and ACP would be how these actors perceive their sensitivities if agreement 
over the EPAs breaks down. For instance each actor would examine its terms 
of mutual dependence. Can ACP countries refuse to go along with the 
provisions of the EPAs? Can they negotiate preferential agreements with an 
alternative country (i.e. the United States)? Are there alternative countries that 
the EU can import commodities and agricultural exports from? Another relevant 
example of sensitivity interdependence that can be considered is the situation 
over the future of SACU. In this scenario, the sensitivity of interdependence 
would be determined by the relative extent to which the BLNS on the one hand, 
and South Africa on the other perceive the effects of potential breakdown of 
SACU. Vulnerability of interdependence by contrast would refer to the relative 
extent to which these actors would be able to follow alternative strategies if 
there is a change in policy, i.e. breakdown of SACU. Krasner for instance 
indicates that in trade relations between a small and large country, the relative 
opportunity costs if there is a breakdown in agreement will be much greater for 
the smaller state, which as a corollary places it in a much weaker political 
position.35 
In establishing a link between politics and international economics, theories of 
international regimes provide valuable insight into the ways in which stronger 
actors can manipulate opportunity costs to force a weaker actor to behave in a 
desired way. Therefore it has been demonstrated that there is a link between 
international economics and politics, in the sense that the political power of 
actors is affected by their relative size and level of development, which as a 
consequence is an important determinant of policy outcomes.  
1.3 Analytic al F ramework 
This study aims to find out how the EU is exerting pressure on SACU members 
to conclude EPAs by making the alignment of both trade regimes contingent on 
all members’ accession to a full EPA. The EU has ultimately presented the 
BLNS and South Africa with a choice which will ultimately determine the future 
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of SACU and its integrity. To this end, the method of process tracing is used, 
which indentifies the intervening causal process or causal chain between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable (outcome).36 As the method of 
process tracing allows an investigator to determine the cause-effect link which 
links the independent and dependent variable, this method can be used to 
explain more complex causality by showing how the convergence of several 
conditions can sometimes determine outcomes. This method can also be used 
as a strong test for theory testing and theory development.37 For instance 
process tracing is a useful methodology for examining the extent to which 
rational-choice theory as defined above explains events. As rational-choice 
theory posits that actors can make decisions in the context of constraints and 
decision making, process tracing would be a useful methodology to examine to 
what extent this explains on the one hand, the decision of the BLNS to initial the 
interim EPA, and on the other, South Africa’s reluctance to follow. Process 
tracing would require an examination of the cause-effect link that connects the 
independent and dependent variables to determine whether the theoretical 
causal explanations (rational-choice theory) are consistent with the causal 
mechanisms in the case of the BLNS and South Africa. Although the objective 
of this research report is not theory testing, the theoretical background can 
identify the causal processes that explain how the relative opportunity costs of 
breakdown in agreement for weaker countries will be much greater, thereby 
placing them in a significantly weaker political position within the negotiation 
process. 
The diagram below illustrates the major causal process between the 
independent and dependent variable. The independent variable is situated on 
the far left, while the dependent variable (variable representing the caused 
phenomenon) is represented on the far right.38 The variables in between form 
part of the intervening causal process as these are caused by the independent 
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variable and affect the dependent variable. The diagram below indicates that 
the convergence of two intervening variables is an important determinant of the 
dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F igure 1 C aus al diagram 
The dependent variable or outcome to be explained in this study is the 
coherence of SACU (IV). This is discussed in the following chapter. The main 
causal process responsible for the variance in the IV is believed to be pressure 
exerted by the EU and more indirectly by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
over the conclusion of EPAs (I).  This is discussed in Chapter 3. The diagram 
above illustrates two main intervening variables (II and III) standing between I 
and IV, the convergence of which affects IV. On the one hand, the EU is 
pressuring (a) the BLNS to initial the interim EPA (b), which these countries 
have already done and in return have been granted duty free quota free access 
to its markets (d). On the other hand, the EU has offered more favourable 
market access to South Africa (e) which would align the tariffs of the EPA and 
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SACU MEMBERS MOVE TOWARD 
INITIALLING EPA:                                
(B) BLNS 
(C) SOUTH AFRICA 
III 
EU OFFER TO SACU (RETROFIT THE 
TERMS OF THE EPA INTO THE TDCA):  
D) BLNS: DUTY-FREE QUOTA-FREE 
 ACCESS 
(E) SOUTH AFRICA: IMPROVED 
 MARKET ACCESS  
II 
EXTERNAL 
PRESSURE TO SIGN 
EPA BY: 
(A) EU (WTO) 
I 
 
INTEGRITY OF SACU 
 
IV 
OUTCOME 
CONVERGENCE PROCESS 
26 
 
integrity of SACU. However the EU has made this contingent on South Africa’s 
accession to the provisions of the EPA (c). The link between II and III illustrates 
that these two intervening variables are mutually dependent on one another, the 
convergence of which will lead to greater coherence within SACU (IV). The 
relationship between II and III forms part of the negotiation process and is 
discussed in Chapter 4.   
The above causal diagram essentially represents one aspect of a trade 
negotiation process between on the one hand, small and medium-sized states 
(by measure of size and relative level of development) and on the other, a more 
dominant trading power. Medium-sized countries in the context of a trade 
negotiation can be considered different for the reason that if there is a 
breakdown in agreement, the relative opportunity costs faced by medium-sized 
states will not be as high as those faced by smaller states. Recalling the 
concept of “asymmetrical interdependence” which specifies that any changes in 
relations as a result of disagreement will be much more costly to the weaker 
actor than to a more dominant actor; it is expected that weaker states will 
accept the terms of a more dominant trading power much easier than medium 
sized-states. This view is simply based on the fact that the relative opportunity 
costs will be much higher for the weaker state than a medium-sized state as 
indicated earlier. 
It follows then that medium-sized countries or countries that face relatively lower 
opportunity costs like South Africa will be more resistant to pressure on the part 
of a more dominant actor. The BLNS by contrast are in a much more vulnerable 
position such as potentially losing out on EU aid and market access for 
instance, which explains their shift toward initialling the Interim EPA Agreement. 
These countries are also heavily dependent on SACU for revenue as a source 
of income. By contrast South Africa has a separate agreement with the EU, 
while SACU represents more of a net cost than a net benefit in terms of the 
current revenue sharing arrangement. The BLNS all form part of the ACP 
countries, which have a long history of co-operation in a number of areas, 
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including: political dialogue, development aid; and trade and economic co-
operation.39 The ACP countries all share a common objective of reducing 
poverty, achieving sustainable development and integrating themselves better 
into the international economy. These countries are discernable in terms of 
development status, as either developing or least developed countries (LDCs) – 
classified according to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 
Human Development Index (HDI).40 Most of these countries have received 
development assistance through the European Development Fund (EDF) and 
have been in the process of negotiating Interim EPA Agreements which were 
supposed to be finalised before the end of 2007.  These are essentially 
agreements that introduce trade reciprocity in the form of EPAs, which are due 
to replace the trade chapters in the Cotonou Agreement.41  
The ACP countries are currently negotiating with the EU within several regional 
groupings. These are the East and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA; the East Africa 
Community (EAC) EPA; the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
EPA; the Central Africa Monetary and Economic Community (CEMAC) EPA; 
the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) EPA; the Pacific 
ACP states (PACP) EPA; and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States 
(CARIFORUM) EPA.42  
As the BLNS form part of the ACP group, these countries have been 
circumscribed within the SADC EPA, together with Mozambique and Angola. In 
this respect the BLNS can be considered typical and representative of the 
broader ACP group. However in certain respects, such as being members of a 
customs union with South Africa makes the BLNS atypical to normal ACP 
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May 2007, p. 5, available from: 
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countries. What further sets the BLNS apart from typical ACP countries is their 
de facto incorporation into the Trade, Development and Co-operation 
Agreement (TDCA) concluded between South Africa and the EU in 1999.43 By 
virtue of their membership in a customs union, the effectiveness of which as 
mentioned requires the enforcement of a CET, the BLNS were incorporated into 
the free trade agreement with South Africa, which under the WTO is considered 
a developed country.44 By contrast, South Africa as a case study can on the one 
hand be considered typical to the BLNS and countries in Southern Africa as it 
forms part of the same customs union and has undertaken regional integration 
initiatives such as the launch of the SADC FTA in August 2008; with an 
ambitious plan to fast-track this to a customs union by 2010. On the other hand, 
the case of South Africa is rendered atypical when considering its relatively 
much more developed and diversified economy, representing over 90 per cent 
of SACU GDP and about 80 per cent of the combined GDP of Southern 
Africa.45 The relative disparities between the BLNS and South Africa makes 
these strong test cases for determining the extent to which the choice of these 
countries in the context of the EPA negotiations is informed by the relative 
opportunity costs faced by these actors. 
In order to understand to what extent the choice of the BLNS and South Africa 
in the context of the EPA negotiations is determined by the relative opportunity 
costs faced by these actors, the next section of this research report presents a 
background of SACU and focuses on the costs and benefits SACU offers to 
South Africa and the BLNS. It focuses on the intergovernmental co-operation 
between members, especially highlighting South Africa’s dominant role in terms 
of decision making. An analysis of the costs and benefits offered by SACU to 
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the BLNS and South Africa also informs the way in which the former and latter 
perceive their opportunity costs of signing onto the interim EPA. 
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C HAP T E R  2 T HE  P OL IT IC AL  E C ONOMY  OF  T HE  S OUT HE R N AF R IC AN 
C US T OMS  UNION 
2.1 Introduc tion 
In assessing the relative opportunity costs faced by South Africa on the one 
hand, and the BLNS on the other in making alternative arrangements if there is 
a potential breakdown in agreement, this chapter provides a brief non-technical 
introduction to customs union theory, which considers the essential 
characteristics and rationale of a customs union. The following part of this 
chapter uses these characteristics in assessing the past and current institutional 
arrangements that have ensured the integrity of SACU, in particular highlighting 
the dominant decision-making role of South Africa. The final part considers the 
major institutional changes of intra-SACU relations in light of the 2002 SACU 
Agreement, in particular focusing on the ability of member states to harmonise 
trade policy with third parties.  
2.2 T he E c onomics  of C us toms  Unions  
Customs union theory focuses on the welfare implications of eliminating tariffs 
between two or more member states while maintaining uniform tariff barriers on 
imports from non-member states.46 The equalisation of tariffs amongst member 
states on imports from non-member states follows that member states must 
share a common external tariff (CET). The CET is the essential defining 
characteristic of a customs union which engenders policy co-ordination among 
member states regarding the allocation of revenues by an agreed upon 
formula.47 The welfare implications of participating in a customs union involve 
an assessment of net economic gains to member countries of participating in a 
customs union. It is expected that states will be willing to participate in a 
customs union arrangement if their perceived net economic benefits exceed 
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their net economic costs. Such analysis draws from economic theories of clubs 
which posits that unless members perceive net gains from participating in a 
club, members would not join (or remains part of the club).48 According to Viner, 
the net welfare gain of a customs union is a function of the trade created on the 
one hand, and the trade diverted, on the other.49 Trade creation represents the 
benefits to members for participating in a customs union; for instance the 
elimination of sales by inefficient high cost domestic industries with cheaper 
priced sales from a member of the customs union. By contrast, trade diversion 
refers to the costs to members of participating in a customs union; for instance 
when more efficient lower-cost imports from countries outside of the customs 
union are displaced in favour of less efficient higher-cost goods produced by a 
member of the customs union.50  Economists generally contend that the trade 
creation and trade diversion effect are not sufficient to explain the net welfare 
gain, but suggest another two motives for the rationale of customs unions. The 
first motive focuses on the effect of the CET on the terms of trade. It is expected 
that the customs union will improve its terms of trade vis-à-vis non-member 
countries that produce competitive products with high price-elasticises of 
demand, as these products will be sourced from within the customs union once 
the CET is imposed.51  This is also likely to render producers within the customs 
union more efficient, leading to greater competition, thereby increasing the 
opportunities to realise economies of scale. The second motive refers to the 
ability of states that are at a comparative disadvantage to maintain domestic 
policies that favour domestic agricultural and industrial production per se, as 
opposed to following strategies that maximise national income.52 For instance 
South Africa had a clear preference for protectionist industrial policies since the 
1920s, which forced the other SACU members to purchase more expensive 
imports from South Africa as opposed to lower cost imports from countries 
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outside of the customs union.53 Therefore in addition to the trade creation and 
trade diversion effect in determining the net economic benefits of membership 
in a customs union, these two factors are also important determinants to the net 
economic benefits, as these may offset the welfare loss accruing to trade 
diversion.  
In determining the net welfare gains to members of participating in an 
integration arrangement such as a customs union, it appears that the additional 
two motives (especially the first) in determining the net welfare gains have 
limited relevance to regional integration schemes amongst developing countries 
or countries of unequal economic size and level of development.  
The track-record of regional integration in Africa provides many examples of 
failed integration efforts, thereby putting into question the correlation between 
on the one hand, economic growth and on the other, competition and 
economies of scale. In theory, a customs union provides protection to a regional 
market through a CET, which can result in a terms of trade gain as mentioned. 
However the way the net benefits are distributed amongst member countries 
depends on their relative size and level of development, thereby making this 
highly relevant to SACU, which has been characterised by extreme inequalities 
in relative size and level of development amongst member states.54   
2.3 C harac teris tic s  of S AC U 
The inequalities between member states are illustrated by the fact that currently 
South Africa represents about 94 per cent of SACU’s GDP.55 In terms of trade 
relations between member states, in 1998/99 South Africa ran a trade surplus 
with the BLNS exceeding ZAR 20 billion and during the same period exported 
goods and services worth more than ZAR 34 billion, which represented between 
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75 and 90 per cent of the BLNS import needs.56 Apart from these quantitative 
descriptions, South Africa has a particularly well developed infrastructure, such 
as telecommunications and transportation; as well as a much more 
sophisticated financial sector.57 As SACU is characterised by such large 
inequalities amongst member states, it follows inevitably that investment and 
economic development has had a polarisation effect toward South Africa.58 This 
is consistent with traditional customs union theory which posits that trade 
between countries with unequal economic size and level of development will 
lead to polarised economic development, favouring the developed member at 
the expense of the less developed member.59 Another notable feature of SACU 
has been the fact that South Africa has unilaterally determined the CET in line 
with its own industrial policies, which have legally obliged the BLNS states to 
apply the same CET, thereby constraining their ability to manipulate fiscal policy 
to meet their development needs.60   
The co-operation that has sustained SACU throughout its history has involved a 
trade-off between on the one hand a political dividend to South Africa, whereby 
the latter has been able to maintain close trade relations and fiscal links with 
African states during the period of political isolation, and on the other, offering 
an increasingly disproportionate share of the revenue pool to the BLNS to pre-
empt any potential withdrawal by its neighbours.61 As a result, the 
compensatory revenue sharing payment on the part of South Africa to the 
Common Revenue Pool (CRP) has offered significant benefits to the BLNS, 
thereby making these countries fiscally dependent on SACU. The size of the 
CRP is determined by the revenues collected through the CET (as determined 
by South Africa). In 2001/02 revenue income from the SACU CRP as a share of 
total revenue was: 13 per cent for Botswana; 51.6 per cent for Lesotho; 51 per 
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cent for Swaziland; and 28.4 per cent for Namibia.62 Therefore it should come 
as no surprise that revenue-sharing has been the most important feature 
surrounding the debates around SACU.  
2.4 T he pers is tent patterns  of S AC U c ooperation 
SACU was established under the 1910 Agreement between South Africa and 
the British High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland (Botswana), 
Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland (BLS). Although Namibia/South West 
Africa had been a de facto member since 1915, it chose to join the Union after 
gaining independence in 1990.63 Since its establishment, the relationship 
between South Africa and the BLNS has been characterised by inherent 
tensions over tariffs and the allocation of revenue. Under the 1910 Agreement, 
South Africa assumed responsibility for determining the CET.64 The CRP was 
also administered by South Africa on a fixed basis, which ensured South Africa 
with a 98.7 per cent share of the revenue.65  South Africa determined the CET 
unilaterally in line with its own industrial development policies, with little 
consideration for the BLS, which were forced to purchase more expensive 
uncompetitive South African imports, as opposed to sourcing lower cost imports 
from countries outside of the Union. However, the independence of the BLS in 
the latter half of the 1960s necessitated a revision of the growing inequality that 
had been reflected in the 1910 Agreement in a new customs union agreement, 
which culminated in the 1969 SACU Agreement.66    
The new 1969 Agreement reflected the changed political landscape as the BLS 
had attained independence, which on the one hand led South Africa to make 
significant concession in the way in which revenue was distributed, and on the 
other, allowed scope for South Africa to continue determining the CET 
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unilaterally. The new 1969 Agreement recognised the need to promote 
economic development in the region on the basis of equality in order “to ensure 
the continued economic development of the customs union area as a whole, 
and to ensure in particular that these arrangements encourage the development 
of the less advanced members of the customs union and the diversification of 
their economies, and afford all parties equitable benefits arising from trade 
among themselves and with other countries”.67 To this end, South Africa made 
significant concessions in the way the CRP was distributed among members by 
incorporating a compensation factor, which according to Alence, had the effect 
of raising the BLS shares two to three fold to what would have accrued under 
the 1910 Agreement.68 Furthermore a stabilisation factor was enacted in 1977 
due to revenue volatility linked to political uprisings in South Africa, which 
ultimately ensured a guaranteed minimum rate of 17 per cent to the BLS.69 The 
new 1969 Agreement in theory also made provision for infant industry protection 
to the BLNS, but was subject to approval by South Africa, which in de facto had 
a very limited effect in promoting industrialisation in the BLS. In terms of the 
CET, South Africa continued to retain the authority to unilaterally determine this 
in line with its own industrial policies, despite recognising the need to give “the 
other contracting parties adequate opportunity for consultations before 
imposing, amending or abrogating any customs duty with respect to goods 
imported into the common customs area from outside”.70 
Therefore this illustrates that despite significant concessions on the part of 
South Africa, the now politically independent BLS were unable to determine 
their industrial, fiscal or development policies as the CET was essentially a 
South African prerogative.  From the perspective of the BLS, the new revenue 
allocation is seen as a compensatory measure for the detrimental trade-
diverting impact resulting from the CET.71 However in recent times, South Africa 
has been increasingly dissatisfied with this arrangement as its share of the CRP 
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has been declining steadily due to higher growth rates of member countries like 
Botswana and changes in South Africa’s tax structure.72 Furthermore, the 
increase of vehicle imports due to the consumer boom in South Africa has 
represented 32 percent of the CRP in 2005 as opposed to only 5 percent in 
2003.73 For instance the tariff on vehicles imported into SACU is 25 percent, of 
which part over half is transferred to the BLNS. By way of example, an imported 
vehicle worth ZAR 200 000, would be subject to ZAR 50 000 in duties, of which 
over 25 000 ZAR would accrue to the BLNS from the CRP.74 
For these reasons between 1993/94 and 2006/7, payments to the BLNS from 
the CRP have increased steadily from approximately 30.2 per cent to 61 per 
cent.75 The South African National Treasury Budget Review 2008 indicates that 
the revenue accruing from customs and excise duties for 2007/08 is estimated 
at ZAR 24.7 billion76, which based on these percentages would result in net 
fiscal transfers from the CRP to the BLNS in the region of between ZAR 10.4 
and 15 billion. As was indicated above, these net fiscal transfers from the CRP 
to the BLNS have reflected a substantial part of the GDP of these countries, 
which the BLNS have become increasingly dependent on.  
The changing political landscape in the 1990s diminished the political 
imperative of sustaining co-operation with the BLS at any cost and led to the 
renegotiated 2002 agreement which recognised the need for more consensual 
relations amongst member states.77 The transition to majority rule in 1994 
inclined the incoming African National Congress (ANC) government to 
institutionalise and democratise SACU. To this end, negotiations towards a 
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reconstituted SACU began in November 1994 in Windhoek.78 After eight years 
of negotiations, the new SACU 2002 Agreement was signed in October 2002 in 
Gaborone, which inter alia, made fundamental changes to the revenue-sharing 
formula.79 The changes reflected in the revenue-sharing formula recognised the 
concerns of the BLNS relating to the detrimental impact of trade diversion and 
the polarisation effects of participating in the same customs union with South 
Africa.80 The new revenue-allocation system of the 2002 SACU Agreement, 
consisting of a customs component, an excise component, and a development 
component, makes provision for compensating the BLNS for these adverse 
effects by ensuring a measure of revenue protection to the BLNS.   
The customs component and the development component are specifically 
designed for this purpose. For instance, the customs revenue is distributed 
according to intra-SACU imports, which are heavily skewed in favour of the 
BLNS, as the latter import considerably more from South Africa than the other 
way around. Under the new formula, the customs revenue share accruing to the 
BLNS would come to about 80 per cent, while South Africa would only receive 
20 per cent of the total share.81 The development component would benefit the 
BLNS even more, as it is specifically designed to benefit the BLNS for the 
decline in the revenue pool (on a basis of per capita income) as a result of 
multilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation on the part of South Africa.82 The 
development component was initially set at 15 per cent of the excise pool, to 
which South Africa contributes about 90 per cent.83 The remainder of the excise 
component under the new Agreement however is distributed in terms of 
members’ GDP value as a percentage of SACU GDP, of which South Africa is 
allocated approximately 92 per cent.84 As excise rates as opposed to customs 
duties are considered important to South Africa, it has been maintained that 
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South Africa has sought to protect this source of income for its own economic 
purposes, which casts doubt over any “democratisation” or “joint decision-
making” emerging over the distribution of this component.85 
Since the conclusion of the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round, South Africa has 
undertaken a significant rationalisation of its tariff structure, reducing the 
number of tariff lines from 10000 to 6000 and maximum tariffs from 100 per cent 
to 30 per cent (excluding sensitive products).86 There have been two notable 
implications for the BLNS as a result of this. On the one hand, the lowering of 
the CET has curtailed the ability of South Africa to promote domestic 
industrialisation as previously, thereby minimising the trade diverting impact 
experienced by the BLNS, and on the other, has resulted in a reduction of the 
amount received by the BLNS from the CRP as a result of a decline in the 
CET.87 Therefore, although the new SACU 2002 Agreement makes provision 
for increased shares of the CRP to the BLNS, these developments should be 
seen in light of increasing trade liberalisation, both multilaterally and bilaterally.  
The trade negotiations between the EU and South Africa, which culminated in 
the signing of the TDCA in 1999, have also had profound implications for the 
BLNS. The lowering of the CET towards the EU as a result of a reduction in 
duties has also contributed to a decline of the revenue collected in the CRP. In 
addition, it has not only presented the BLNS with increased competition from 
EU goods in their markets, but also competition in the South African market, as 
a result of a reduction of duties for EU imports.88   
It has been estimated that the total revenue losses experienced by the BLNS as 
a result of the TDCA range between ZAR 1.9 billion and ZAR 3.5 billion per 
year, which translates into decreasing levels of spending on social services (i.e. 
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health, housing, education); infrastructural projects; and development.89 The 
EU-South Africa TDCA in de facto transformed the non-reciprocal EU-BLNS 
trade relations into a reciprocal preferential agreement alongside South Africa.90  
As mentioned earlier, although the 1969 SACU Agreement makes provision for 
consultations to take place with regard to undertaking changes in the CET, the 
BLNS were excluded from the negotiation process which fundamentally 
transformed their trade relationship with the EU.91  
2.5 T he 2002 S AC U Agreement:  T owards  a s ingle arrangement vis -à-
vis  third parties ?  
The new 2002 SACU Agreement however contains provisions requiring consent 
of all members prior to any new agreements with third parties. Article 31, 
paragraph 2 of the Agreement states that “with respect to future trade 
negotiations with third parties a common negotiating mechanism in accordance 
with the terms of reference to be determined by the Council in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 and 7 of Article 8 for the purpose of undertaking negotiations with 
third parties”.92  
Similarly, Article 31, paragraph 3 underscores this by stating that “no member 
state shall negotiate and enter into new preferential trade agreements with third 
parties or amend existing agreements without the consent of other member 
states”.93 However, as the TDCA and other preferential external agreements 
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predate the 2002 SACU Agreement, these are exempted by Article 31, 
paragraph 1, which states that “member states may maintain preferential trade 
and other related arrangements existing at the time of entry into force of this 
Agreement”.94  
Therefore the exemption provided in Article 31, paragraph 1 presents a 
challenge to harmonising existing trade relations with the negotiation of any 
future agreements with third parties. This has important implications for the CET 
which is essentially the defining characteristic of SACU.  The EPA negotiations 
between the BLNS and the EU (which exclude South Africa) present one such 
challenge in particular. For instance it would be inconsistent for South Africa to 
have one tariff on imports from the EU (via the TDCA), whilst the BLNS apply a 
different tariff on imports from the EU (under the EPA). In such a scenario 
internal border controls would have to be maintained in order to enforce the 
different rules of origin, which would ultimately undermine the integrity of SACU 
and its CET.  
As there is no single arrangement that directs trade between SACU and a third 
party, Stevens contends that if the EPA agreement does not include all five 
members, it would be legally unenforceable.95 This illustrates the lack of 
harmonisation in determining rules of origin between member states, which is 
linked to the adoption of common intra-regional policies in industrial policy, 
agricultural policy, competition policy and unfair trade practices, as set out in 
Part Eight of the new 2002 SACU Agreement.96  
To this end, the new Agreement emphasises the importance of supra-national 
(intra-state) institutions in governing industrial and trade policy. It lists six new 
SACU institutions which are to govern these functions, namely, the Council of 
Ministers; the Customs Union Commission; the Secretariat; the Tariff Board; 
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Technical Liaison Committees; and a Tribunal.97 Reference to these institutions 
is made only insofar as these inform the attainment of adopting common 
policies as set out in the new Agreement.  
The adoption of common policies in policy areas among member states as set 
out in the new Agreement appears to be a problematic issue, if not unrealistic 
when considering the disparate level of development and the lack of institutional 
capacity to implement the Agreement. With respect to the implementation of 
common intra-regional policies in industrial policy, agricultural policy and 
competition policy, members are to attain these objectives through their own 
national legislature, thereby not being subjected to enforceability by any of the 
supra-national institutions highlighted above.98 Only in terms of unfair trade 
practices can the Council undertake the development of common policies in 
addressing unfair trade practices amongst member states.99 Despite this, 
decisions made within the Council are reached through “consensus”, meaning 
that these have to be reached collectively and unanimously by member states. 
Gibb maintains that in certain instances where a deadlock situation exists, the 
Council can potentially refer a matter to the Tribunal, which is supra-national in 
nature and has the authority to make final and binding decisions.100  
However an important qualification is in order; as the new Agreement does not 
clarify the terms on which the Council can refer an item for settlement by the 
Tribunal, given that decisions within the Council are reached by consensus, a 
member state can veto a Council decision regarding referral to the Tribunal.101 
Similarly, under the new Agreement, decisions made by the Tariff Board 
regarding amendments in the level of customs, anti-dumping, countervailing 
and safeguard duties on the importation of goods into the customs are also to 
be reached by consensus between member states. However, once again, in a 
deadlock situation, a member may veto a decision to refer an item to the 
Tribunal.   
                                            
97 Gibb, R., (3) op.Cit, p. 596. 
98 Erasmus, G., (2) op.Cit, p. 190. 
99 Ibid, p. 190-191.  
100 Gibb, R., (3) op.Cit, p. 600. 
101 Locit. 
42 
 
It has been indicated that the adoption of common policies is a clear 
requirement for harmonising trade-policy and developing the ability of 
concluding new trade agreements with third parties. However, the ability of 
adopting common policies is contingent on the effectiveness of the common 
institutions set out in the new Agreement, as highlighted above. As has been 
shown, in certain areas, member states still retain a considerable measure of 
sovereignty in implementing common policies. In other areas in which co-
operation is mandated by the common institutions, the possibility of 
fragmentation still exists, given the fact that Agreement in the Council is 
reached by consensus. There are also new disciplines which have become 
increasingly important in trade negotiations that are not covered by the new 
Agreement; such as services, trade facilitation, intellectual property, investment 
and competition.102 These so called “new generation” issues are very important 
to the EU and constitute binding provisions in the EPA negotiations. Similarly, in 
the negotiations of the US/SACU FTA, the US also had a clear preference for 
the inclusion of new generation issues, which presented a major challenge to 
SACU countries, although in the end SACU-US talks broke down and did not 
culminate into a FTA.103 As mentioned, although Part Eight of the Agreement 
makes provision for the further development of common policies which would in 
theory allow for the negotiation of new disciplines; it appears that SACU is still a 
long way from pursuing such initiatives of “deepening” policy harmonisation 
within SACU and should rather first “pick the low-hanging fruit inherent in 
getting the basics of operating a customs union right”.104  
Whatever the case, it is clear from the above that the reconciling of domestic 
policies among member states in several policy areas is a prerequisite for the 
development of common negotiating strategies in negotiating with third parties, 
which ultimately determines the legal quality of SACU and its capacity to act as 
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a customs union.105 As was mentioned, the new Agreement does not clearly 
specify how member states are to develop these common policies and 
furthermore enforcement is in many policy areas subject to national laws; 
thereby exempting the supranational common institutions alluded to above. In 
cases where co-operation is enforced by a supranational institution, given that 
binding decisions by the Tribunal can be potentially vetoed within the Council, 
raises some concern over the rules-based nature of the customs union.106 This 
also reflects the inter- as opposed to the intra-governmental nature of decision 
making within these common institutions, thereby giving preference to the 
national, as opposed to the common regional interests.107  
In terms of international regime theory, this position is consistent with the 
structural realist view, which depicts regime outcomes as a function of the 
distribution of power among states, thereby reflecting the bargaining power and 
national interest of the more dominant actor. Although regime theory is far too 
simple to capture the complexity of the interaction between member states in 
SACU, it shows that the arrangement between member states, even under the 
new SACU 2002 Agreement still reflects the asymmetries inherent in the 
distribution of power amongst member states. It is therefore not surprising that 
in relation to decision making within the new SACU 2002 Agreement Gibb 
contends that “... given the history of SACU and the geo-economic realities... it 
is hard to envisage a situation where Lesotho has the same voting rights as 
South Africa”.108 
2.6 S ummary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the past and present institutional 
context which has characterised SACU as a customs union. A notable feature 
which has remained constant throughout its history is the inherent asymmetry in 
relative size and level of development among member states. These 
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asymmetries have made the task of regional integration and development very 
difficult, if not impossible. The historical overview of SACU indicates that 
regional integration or development has never been an end in itself, but under 
the 1969 Agreement served a political purpose by tying the BLNS with South 
Africa to maintain the geo-political status quo during the period of political 
isolation. The new SACU 2002 Agreement represents a fundamental break with 
the past by providing an institutional framework operating on a more consensual 
basis, which in theory seeks to distribute benefits more equitably among 
member states. However, as mentioned, there are inherent weaknesses 
relating to the operational nature of the common institutions, which has 
important implications for harmonising trade policy with regard to third parties. 
The next chapter seeks to examine how these weaknesses are compounded by 
the trade policies of the EU towards SACU in the context of the shift toward 
reciprocal trade relations on the part of the EU.  
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C HAP T E R  3 T HE  E U AND S OUT HE R N AF R IC A:  C ONDIT IONAL IT Y , 
DIF F E R E NT IAT ION AND T HE  S HIF T  T OW AR D 
R E C IP R OC AL  T R ADE  R E L AT IONS  
3.1 Introduc tion 
This first part of this chapter examines the shift in the EU’s trade preferences 
from non-reciprocity toward the introduction of reciprocal trade relations under 
the form of EPAs. As part of the reason advanced by the EU for the shift toward 
greater liberalisation and reciprocity has been meeting WTO compatibility, this 
part examines the conflicting views between the EU and ACP over satisfying 
the minimum requirements of making the EPAs compliant with the WTO. Apart 
from EPAs, this part also considers alternative trade arrangements, but 
concludes that these offer limited options, thereby serving to constrain the 
choice of ACP countries to EPAs. The subsequent part considers the 
developmental dimension of EPAs, arguing that trade related assistance has 
been linked to the EPA negotiations. The final part considers South Africa’s shift 
toward trade liberalisation in light of the TDCA and the compensatory measures 
offered to the BLNS to gain political acceptance for the TDCA.  
3.2 T he s hift toward rec iproc al trade relations  
The policy frameworks governing trade and development co-operation between 
the EU and ACP countries have evolved through various phases; beginning 
with the Yaoundé Convention (1963-1974), followed by the four Lomé  
Conventions (1975-2000) and the current Cotonou Agreement, signed in 
2000.109 The Lomé Conventions did not deliver satisfactory results in achieving 
its stated objectives, which led the European Commission (EC) to propose 
major changes in the way trade preferences will be governed. To this end, 
economic and trade co-operation in the Cotonou Agreement is aimed at 
promoting the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world 
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economy.110 The most important change which represents a significant break 
with the past relates to the shift from non-reciprocal trading arrangement to the 
introduction of reciprocity within the framework of Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). There appears that in advancing EPAs as future 
modalities for trade co-operation, the EU has pursued two potentially conflicting 
objectives.111 On the one hand, Article 35 of the Cotonou Agreement states that 
trade co-operation will seek to be compatible with existing regional integration 
efforts, but on the other, in determining which countries are in a position to enter 
into an EPA, the EU has divided the membership of the ACP countries 
according to developmental criteria.112  
This has complicated matters for SACU; for instance, Lesotho is classified as 
an LDC, while Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia are classified as non-LDCs 
(developing countries); and to complicate things even further, South Africa is a 
non-ACP country and is classified “developed” under the WTO, thereby making 
use of its TDCA in trade vis-à-vis the EU.113 Apart from trade in goods 
provisions, the Cotonou Agreement underscores the importance for the 
negotiation of “new generation issues”, while the TDCA is limited to trade in 
goods only. These issues are further discussed in Chapter 4.  
The first Lomé Convention was concluded between the EEC and forty-six ACP 
countries in 1975. Lomé succeeded the former Yaoundé Convention to expand 
membership to former ACP British colonies. The group of ACP members 
eventually incorporated seventy-eight members by the year 2000, which 
provided a strong rationale for North-South cooperation.114 The Lomé 
Conventions were comprised of an aid and trade pillar.  
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The aid pillar was divided into programmable assistance or project assistance, 
and non programmable assistance. Programmable assistance dealt with 
national and regional indicative programmes and Structural Adjustment Aid. 
Non-programmable assistance was conditional, relating to circumstantial needs. 
The latter consisted of export revenue stabilisation funds for agricultural 
products (Stabex) and a new system for mineral and mining exports, known as 
Sysmin which was introduced with the signing of Lomé II in 1979.115 These 
mechanisms ensured compensation to ACP countries during periods of lower 
export earnings.  
One of the main features of the Lomé Conventions was the trade pillar, which 
ensured ACP countries with non-reciprocal duty-free market access to the EU 
market, which discriminated positively in favour of ACP states at the expense of 
excluding other developing countries which are not party to the Lomé 
Convention, but at a similar level of development, such as Bangladesh, 
Guatemala or Honduras.116 The main objectives of these preferences were to 
ensure the sustainable economic development of these countries and to 
promote their gradual integration into the world economy.117 Despite the fact 
that the ACP countries wanted to preserve the status-quo under the Lomé 
Convention, the EU advanced two main reasons as to why this regime had to 
be renegotiated.  
First, the results of Lomé were disappointing as it did not achieve its stated 
objectives. To this end, the European Commission (EC) published a document 
entitled Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP 
Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New 
Partnership, in which it argued that the ACP exports to the EU on average 
constitute 40-60 percent, thereby suggesting that significant diversification had 
not taken place and that the share of ACP exports to the EU have declined from 
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6.7 per cent in 1976 to 2.8 per cent in 1994; in general the document states that 
the ACP “have not been able to take advantage of all the opportunities offered 
by the special preferences granted under the Lomé Convention”.118 
The second, perhaps most important reason requiring the revision of this 
regime is attributable to changes within the multilateral trading system on the 
one hand, and the need to comply with the rules of this system, on the other. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the prevailing views on industrialisation shifted 
away from import substitution toward export-growth led models, which was 
reflected within the multilateral trade regime by making the promotion of 
domestic industries and selective protection vis-à-vis foreign third parties 
increasingly difficult.119  In this light, the special and differentiated treatment 
(SDT) preferences extended to developing countries have been eroded by 
progressive rounds of tariff reductions such as the Uruguay Round.120 Gibb 
notes that there has been a significant reduction of the EU’s CET from 10-12 
percent in the 1970s to between 3-4 percent after the implementation of the 
Uruguay Round, which has reduced the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff 
extended to all WTO members.121  
Aside from multilateral liberalisation, preference erosion has also occurred and 
still occurs as a consequence of a number of phenomena. First, the conclusion 
of FTAs with regional groups such as South Africa, Mercosur, Turkey, Morocco 
and others extends these countries the same market access to the EU 
market.122 Second, the reform of the European Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) aims to move away from price support toward granting direct aid to 
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farmers.123 This will reduce the artificially high agricultural prices to world market 
prices, thereby lowering the prices ACP producers receive on the EU market for 
agricultural products.124 Third, the introduction of the EU’s Everything But Arms 
(EBA) initiative introduced in March 2001 allows duty-free market access to the 
EU market for all LDCs alongside ACP countries.125 This exempts arms and 
ammunition; and includes qualifications for sensitive products like rice and 
sugar, which are to be fully liberalised by the end of 2009.126 
Despite that, significant erosion of preferences has taken place and still takes 
place, the most serious reason for the ending of the Lomé Convention relates to 
the rules and values of the multilateral trading system. The first Article of the 
GATT requires non-discrimination and compliance with the MFN principal by 
stating that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the territories of all other members”.127 As Lomé allowed 
discriminatory treatment to the ACP, but excluded other countries at similar 
levels of development, it violated the MFN principal. In response, the Green 
Paper acknowledges that this has provided ACP countries with liberal rules of 
origin, but argues that the multilateral trade system has undermined the Lomé 
preferences with respect to the principles of non-discrimination and non-
reciprocity.128 Therefore, the Cotonou Agreement which replaced Lomé had to 
take into account the rules of the multilateral trading system, which had become 
incompatible with Lomé. Many authors including Gibb contend that the EU has 
placed the WTO in the centre of the negotiations, not only in informing the 
successor of Lomé, but the negotiations over the EPAs.129 It appears that the 
EU has used WTO compliance as a fait accompli for justifying changes in 
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regimes, especially in the context of the EPA negotiations, which Goodison 
depicts as a “common EC rhetorical ploy”.130  
The Cotonou Agreement, which replaced the 25 year old Lomé framework, was 
signed in 2000 and reflected the shift of the multilateral trading system toward a 
more liberal position, emphasising the economic integration of markets and 
greater economic openness, which not only takes into account trade in goods, 
but contains provision for the negotiation of new generation issues as 
mentioned earlier. It is set to last until 2020 with an important qualification for its 
trade chapter, which was to be replaced by the end of 2007.131 The Cotonou 
Agreement consists of three interrelated pillars: political, development, and 
economic and trade cooperation.132 The most fundamental change is 
represented within the first pillar which sets out to negotiate new EPAs, which 
are presently being negotiated to prevent any loss of market access to the EU 
market. These are to replace the non-reciprocal market access provisions 
previously enjoyed under the Lomé, which were extended under the Cotonou 
Agreement through a WTO waiver secured in 2001, which expired on 31 
December 2007.133 Within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, the 
objective of the economic and trade cooperation is aimed at “fostering the 
smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States in the world economy”.134 It 
also aims at improving trading, supply and production capacity; as well as 
enhancing capacity to attract foreign investment.135  
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As regional integration has informed the EU’s domestic experience, this has 
influenced its belief that this model will also benefit other regions.136 Therefore it 
comes as no surprise that when considering the modalities surrounding the 
implementation of EPAs, these contain strong elements of regional integration. 
For instance Article 35 of the Cotonou Agreement states that “economic and 
trade cooperation shall build on the regional integration initiatives of ACP 
States, bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the 
integration of ACP countries into the world economy”.137 For this reason the EU 
has had a clear preference for negotiating EPAs on a regional basis. In theory 
the trade reform envisaged by the EPAs can lead to lower prices, increased 
competition and higher economic growth, however it has been argued that this 
is more applicable to North-North relations, as opposed to North-South 
relations, in which case necessitates meeting certain preconditions prior to 
undertaking such reforms.138 This has informed the central debate between the 
EU and the ACP countries in the context of the EPA negotiations. The latter 
have argued that in order to be able to benefit from the EPAs, supply-side 
constraints such as infrastructure should be addressed in sequence to 
progressive opening of markets, as well as strengthening of institutional 
capacity, aimed at improving the capacity of these countries to negotiate and 
implement EPAs.139 By contrast, the EU has cited the benefits of increased 
economic growth emerging as a result of the reciprocal liberalisation required 
under Article XXIV (GATT/WTO) and the additional benefits of the EPAs, which 
contain provisions for the negotiation of new generation issues.  
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3.3 T he WT O dimens ion 
One of the key issues over the negotiation of the EPAs has been ensuring 
compliance with GATT’s Article XXIV which requires FTAs to “eliminate duties 
and other restrictive regulations of commerce...on substantially all the trade 
between constituent territories in products originating in such territories”.140 
However as there has been no clear definition as to how “substantially all trade” 
is measured, or what proportion of trade is to be liberalised amongst parties, it 
has generally been maintained that between 80 and 90 percent of total trade 
between member states is sufficient to meet WTO compatibility. Therefore in 
theory, if an ACP grouping were to liberalise 60 percent of its trade toward the 
EU, while the EU liberalised 100 percent of its imports from an ACP grouping, 
this would meet the “substantially all trade” requirement. In reality, however it 
has been argued that most ACP countries are heavily dependent on tariff 
revenues, which will significantly inform the level of reciprocity that these 
countries will accept in the context of tariff-elimination on the part of the EU.141 
Furthermore when considering FTA agreements concluded between the EU 
and third parties, these have liberalised over 90 percent of total trade, in which 
case the EU’s partners have actually liberalised a greater share of imports than 
the EU.142  
In addition to the requirement of liberalising “substantially all trade”, according to 
Article XXIV (GATT/WTO), this is to be achieved within “a reasonable length of 
time”, which is understood to be 10-12 years, except in “exceptional cases”, 
without clarifying what constitutes such cases.143 As these requirements are 
subject to interpretation, ACP countries in some regional groupings (i.e. ESA) 
have tended to propose longer transition periods of up to 35 years. However the 
EC has been adamant in accepting such extended transition periods of tariff 
elimination, citing the “spectre of WTO compatibility”.144 However Bilal and 
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Rampa contend that longer time frames are adopted unilaterally by the 
participating parties to an FTA, which in practice is not subject to WTO 
interpretation or dispute settlement.145 
This illustrates on the one hand, the limited flexibility that the multilateral trading 
system provides to developing countries by virtue of their level of development, 
and on the other, that the provisions of the EPAs will predetermine the future of 
ACP trade policy (i.e. liberalising domestic markets vis-à-vis the EU), over 
which ACP countries have limited influence. As an alternative to EPAs, the EU 
also offers other trade arrangements, based on developmental status - such as 
its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the GSP-plus and the EBA. 
3.4 Alternatives  to E P As  
The GSP ranks relatively low (just above MFN treatment) on the EU’s pyramid 
of trade preferences which allows duty-free access for non-sensitive products 
and a reduced tariff at the MFN rate for sensitive products.146 It was developed 
within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
since 1968 and has been open to all developing countries (LDCs and non-
LDCs). However, the preferences offered by this arrangement can be 
unilaterally withdrawn at any time by the EU and cover much fewer products 
with stricter rules of origin.147 The non-LDCs that chose not to sign the interim 
agreements as the end of 2007 deadline was approaching have been 
downgraded to the less advantageous GSP. For instance it has been estimated 
that Namibian beef exports to the EU would face 142 percent higher tariffs 
under the GSP.148 By contrast, the GSP-plus provides additional benefits of 
duty-free market access for countries that implement international conventions 
relating to human and labour rights, environmental standards and good 
governance, but still has restrictive rules of origin.149 The LDCs on the other 
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hand qualify for duty-free and quota-free market access to the EU under the 
EBA initiative, which provides the most favourable treatment. Despite this, the 
EBA offers very stringent rules of origin, which in some instances are less 
favourable than those offered under the EPAs and preferences can be 
withdrawn at any time as it is a non-contractual arrangement.150 Furthermore 
countries that take advantage of the EBA, but at the same time form part of a 
regional arrangement that is negotiating an EPA will have to maintain stringent 
border controls to enforce the different rules of origin. Given that these countries 
have limited capacity of enforcing these, LDCs using the EBA will in de facto 
become party to the EPAs.151 Therefore LDCs like Mozambique and Lesotho 
that qualify for the EBA had initialled the interim EPA agreement with the EU a 
month before the expiry of the WTO waiver. Under the EPA for instance, a 
country like Lesotho can export apparel products to the EU market under the 
single transformation rule which allows cumulation of origin (i.e. apparel made 
from imported materials), which is not allowed under the EBA due to its 
restrictive rules of origin criteria.152 Therefore its decision to initial the interim 
agreement has been driven by perceived economic opportunities of market 
opening.  
Since January 2008, the EU has presented EPA countries with a new 
opportunity by offering duty-free, quota-free access (DFQF) to all imports with a 
qualification for sugar and rice, to be phased in by 2010 and 2015 
respectively.153 This has been part of the EU’s broader commitment to Aid for 
Trade by seeking to compensate EPA countries for the adverse consequences 
of market opening, which will have several implications, inter-alia: undermining 
tariff revenues; reduced access to services resulting from privatisation of public 
goods; de-industrialisation in some regions; and the undermining of regional 
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economic integration efforts.154 In this regard the “development dimension” of 
the EPAs acknowledges that these are not mere FTAs, but are accompanied by 
development assistance provided under the current 10th European 
Development Fund (EDF), which entered into force 1 July 2008.155 To this end, 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson contends that EPAs are to be seen as 
“trade and development tools... not classical hardnosed free trade agreements 
of the sort that developing blocks negotiate between them[selves]”.156 However 
the manner in which trade related adjustment funding is distributed under the 
EDF suggests that the process is linked to that of the EPA negotiations.   
3.5 T he introduc tion of c onditionality for E U aid in the c ontext of the 
E P As  
Under the previous Lomé Conventions a significant part of aid had been 
allocated toward agriculture and rural sector development. Consequently under 
the 9th EDF, support for agriculture and rural sector development declined 
dramatically in favour of structural adjustment support.157 This clearly indicates 
the EU’s preference for allocating aid in support for improving supply capacity 
and economic adjustment. Under the 10th EDF, the EU has agreed to commit a 
figure of €22.6 billion, which is set to run up until 2013. From this amount, €17.9 
billion has been allocated for development support, which is to be channelled 
though the Regional and National Indicative Programmes (RIPs and NIPs).158 
However, ACP negotiators have argued that the resources provided under the 
EDF will be insufficient to meet the adjustment costs of the EPAs highlighted 
above and have requested increased resources in addition to those provided 
under the EDF. The European Commission’s response has been that the EPA 
negotiations are ultimately trade negotiations which are not part of the 
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aid/development pillar under the Cotonou Agreement.159 As the mandate of the 
European Commission excludes undertaking negotiations in the aid pillar, 
Regional Preparatory Task Forces (RPTFs) containing members of the 
negotiating parties were established in order to ensure coherence between the 
EPA negotiations and development cooperation.160  
The linking of the RPTF discussions to the programming of the 10th EDF has 
proved to be a frustrating process given that in regions where ACP groupings 
have carried out costly assessments of adjustment costs; these have been 
rejected by the EC.161 Another point of concern for the ACP countries has been 
that EPA-related adjustments will be provided under the EDF, which in addition, 
also provides funding for other development programmes (i.e. health, rural 
development, water, etc.). This means that in financing EPA-related 
adjustments, this may involve diverting money away from other EDF 
programmes.162 
This illustrates the potential link between the aid for trade agenda and the EPA 
negotiations, which suggests that aid for trade in this case can serve a political 
purpose for “buying” progress in the trade negotiations. In this respect the EC’s 
position has been that aid and trade are two separate processes and affirmed 
that aid for trade is not contingent on the conclusion of EPAs, but will be 
available regardless of whether these are concluded.163 The ACP countries 
have however drawn linkages between commitments made in the context of 
EPA negotiations and aid assistance. To this end, ACP countries have favoured 
including binding commitments on aid for trade delivery in the EPA texts.164 
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Despite the differentiation between aid for trade and the commitments in the 
EPAs on the part of the EC, the latter has viewed both processes “mutually 
reinforcing”, in the sense that it has implied that the successful adoption of “the 
right policy framework” will lead to increased assistance. 165  
For Commissioner Mandelson, trade related adjustment is a means to an end, 
and while policy reform is not translated into practice there can be “no 
cheques”.166 In this respect, “the right policy framework” for the EU relates to 
undertaking liberalisation and “locking in” reforms in respect to the so called 
“new generation” issues prior to implementing additional EPA-related 
adjustments.  
By contrast ACP countries have argued that trade-related assistance geared 
towards capacity building should come prior to undertaking liberalisation 
commitments. However Goodison contends that the EC has had considerable 
leverage in encouraging ACP trade ministers to conclude the EPAs through “the 
engineered convergence of the final stages of the EPA negotiations with the 
programming of 10th EDF aid resources”.167 This illustrates the link between 
trade related assistance in the context of the EPAs negotiations and the 
programming of the 10th EDF. From a broader perspective, this is also reflective 
of the shift away from “entitlement aid” towards more conditionality attached to 
aid preferences. For instance under the Cotonou Agreement “political 
conditionalities” have been included which emphasise inter-alia, respect for 
human rights, good governance, democratic principles and other objectives 
consistent with the EU’s foreign policy objectives.168 Therefore this is 
representative of the broader Western ideology of promoting development 
through trade rather than aid.  
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3.6 S outh Afric a’s  s hift toward trade liberalis ation in the pos t-1994 era 
It was against this backdrop that South Africa sought to develop new trade 
relations with the EU. The transition to majority rule in 1994 inclined the 
incoming ANC government to seek a new trade relationship with the EU, which 
would be complementary to its long-term economic and political objectives of 
economic growth and development. To this end, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) has been the main instrument through which policy measures 
have been implemented in regard to stimulating market-based incentives, in 
particular focusing on trade reform and competition policy.169 This approach is 
consistent with the neoliberal model which posits that free trade and competition 
is the key to most efficient distribution of resources, thereby maximizing both 
national and international welfare.   
Prior to the 1990s, the South African economy had been characterised by a 
persistent negative trade balance mainly due to the import substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) policies and capital subsidies. As economic growth has 
been dependent on ability to import, these policies, combined with its deepening 
political isolation inhibited economic growth and led to stagnation in the 
domestic economy.170 However, Cassim et al. note that trade liberalisation had 
already been initiated as early as the 1980s, particularly to reduce the anti-
export bias resulting from these ISI policies.171 This resulted in providing 
incentive to export through the short lived General Export Incentive Scheme 
(GEIS) in 1990, which was dismantled in 1994 as part of South Africa’s offer to 
the multilateral trading system under the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round.172 This 
once again highlights the spectre of GATT/WTO compatibility which has made 
selective protection vis-à-vis foreign third parties increasingly more difficult 
under progressive rounds of tariff reductions. As was mentioned in this chapter, 
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South Africa has undertaken a significant reduction in tariff levels and in certain 
instances has reduced these below the required level of the GATT/WTO.173  
Another important market-based incentive which is seen increasingly 
complementary to trade reform has been competition policy. In addition to the 
net welfare gains (trade creation versus trade diversion) stemming from 
participation in a regional trade arrangement (i.e. customs union or FTA) as 
alluded to in chapter 2, in theory it is assumed that this will lead to increased 
competition. In turn, this is likely to contribute to a more efficient allocation of 
resources, thereby resulting in price reductions for goods and services. From a 
broader perspective, competition policy and other “new generation” issues are 
clearly consistent with the liberal approaches to political economy, which in this 
respect delegate a minimalist role of the state along the continuum of state 
versus market.  
When considering the protectionist industrial policies of South Africa in the past 
and the strategic role played by the state in formulating these, it comes as no 
surprise that competition policy law and enforcement have been weak. For 
instance, although an anti-trust enforcement agency in the form of a 
Competition Board had been created in 1980, there had been no successful 
prosecutions in terms of anti-competitive practices over a period of 20 years, up 
until 2000.174 Part of the reason for this has been that under the pre-1994 
regime, the pursuance of highly protectionist industrialisation policies required 
close government co-operation with the business community which was 
comprised of a privileged group of companies and entrepreneurs.175 With the 
advent of the new 1994 government, competition law reform was not given 
much precedence either, in the main for political imperatives, amongst which 
include the effect on public enterprises and public policies, such as employment 
creation and Black Empowerment Equity requirements.176  
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3.7 WT O plus  is s ues  in the E P A negotiations  
However the inclusion of competition policy issues, along with the other 
Singapore issues (government procurement, trade facilitation and investment) 
has increasingly appeared both on the agenda of the multilateral trading system 
and in bilateral FTA agreements, the most notable of which in respect to this 
research report are the EPAs and the EU-SA TDCA. These issues were first 
raised at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 by the EU and 
are often referred to as the “Singapore issues” or the so-called “behind the 
border” issues.177 Since the Doha Round, the EU has been a firm advocate of 
including these issues on the WTO agenda, but the refusal of developing 
countries to negotiate these has made this task more difficult.178 Therefore 
these outstanding issues are depicted as “WTO plus” and are not necessary for 
securing a WTO-compatible basis for negotiating bilateral agreements. As these 
provisions have been excluded from the WTO agenda, the EU has made these 
integral parts of future FTA Agreements. Although the EPAs have a strong 
developmental aspect, from the above assessment on aid for trade, it can be 
argued that these are essentially FTAs with a political “sweetener” to gain 
political acceptance of the inclusion of these issues on the part of ACP 
countries. 
3.8 T he T rade, Development and C ooperation Agreement 
The situation for South Africa however is different as its trade is framed under 
the TDCA and covers mainly trade in goods, without any obligation to negotiate 
any “new generation issues”. From the start, South Africa had a preference to 
pursue full participation of the Lomé Convention, but this was rejected by the 
EC on the grounds of its “developed” status under the WTO and its economic 
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sophistication relative to other ACP economies.179 Hence, its exclusion from the 
Lomé trade chapter necessitated the negotiation of the TDCA.  
The TDCA is a bilateral agreement between the EU and South Africa, signed in 
1999, committing both sides to immediate liberalisation which commenced on 1 
February 2000.180 Under the TDCA, both sides are reducing tariffs to zero over 
a transitional period; by 2010, 95 percent of South African exports will be 
entering the EU market duty free; while by 2012, 86 percent of EU exports will 
be entering the South African market duty free. Both sides agree that this meets 
the WTO-compatible basis and essentially meets the requirements of Article 
XXIV (GATT/WTO). A review process is also included in the TDCA taking place 
every five years, which can be used by both parties to reopen talks on 
undertaking further negotiations in certain issues, such as sensitive products.  
Although the TDCA will fully liberalise trade in goods on substantially all trade, 
both sides have placed certain sensitive products on a review list. The review 
list contains sensitive products which are partially liberalised and back-loaded, 
with tariffs being phased out towards the end of the implementation period. For 
the EU, agricultural products have been a sensitive area, which has proved 
difficult to negotiate. Despite this, Goodison contends that this was the first time 
the EU has included its agricultural sector in a FTA.181  
In this regard, the EU had agreed to liberalise 62 percent of agricultural imports 
from South Africa. Out of the excluded portion of 38 percent, 12 percent are 
subject to partial liberalisation through tariff quotas, thereby in de facto reducing 
total agricultural exclusions from South Africa to 26 percent.182 In contrast, 
South Africa has also subjected certain agricultural and industrial products from 
the EU to partial liberalisation or exclusion, most notably motorcar components 
and some steel products.183 Although both sides can use the review process to 
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further liberalise any of the products on the exclusion list, any liberalisation of 
products by one member, would require this to be offset by a concomitant 
liberalisation by the other member. In this regard South Africa has been 
reluctant to re-open the agreement with the EU as it has feared pressure of 
having to offset product liberalisation by the EU with its sensitive sectors, such 
as its automotive industry.184 This has important implications for the BLNS and 
SACU. 
It was indicated in the preceding chapter that the EU-South Africa TDCA in de 
facto transformed the non-reciprocal EU-BLNS trade relations into a reciprocal 
preferential agreement, alongside South Africa. As the TDCA was negotiated 
prior to the SACU 2002 Agreement, at a time in which South Africa unilaterally 
determined the CET and revenue issues in line with its own needs, the BLNS 
were excluded from the negotiation process.185  
3.9 T DC A c ompens atory meas ures  and B L NS  ac c eptanc e of greater 
trade liberalis ation 
Despite this, in terms of the negotiation process, both South Africa and the EU 
have tried to not only accommodate the interests of the BLNS in the context of 
SACU, but also the interests of the broader SADC region. To that end, South 
Africa has excluded certain products which are considered sensitive to ACP 
countries on the South African market, such as beef, some sugar products and 
some cereals.186  
The EU has emphasised its development rhetoric by stating that “In line with our 
general policy, which is to actively encourage economic integration at regional 
level, we wanted to ensure that we would not gain better access to the South 
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African market than the SADC countries. Concepts such as ‘SADC first’ or 
SADC preference have underpinned the negotiations, and we showed a lot of 
understanding, for example in the textile sector, when it was explained that 
South Africa would prefer to reserve certain trade concessions for its SADC 
partners”.187 However, it has been argued that “South Africa’s offer to SADC is 
superior to its offer to the EU, though the preferential market offer can only be 
accessed by non-SACU countries for a limited number of products within three 
to five years. These concessions are small considering the development gap 
between non-SACU SADC countries and SA-SACU countries”.188 Furthermore 
under the TDCA, there are certain value-added products of potential interest to 
the BLNS which are not excluded.189 These include products such as processed 
meat and apparel, in which South Africa has received better preferential access 
to the EU under the TDCA, than the BLNS under the Cotonou Agreement.190 
This is indicative of the fact that the EU has a preference for differentiated tariff 
offers to South Africa on the one hand, and the BLNS on the other.  
In addition to excluding certain sensitive products, the TDCA also contains a 
safeguard clause which is designed as a remedial action to protect BLNS 
interests from negative effects stemming from the introduction of free trade. In 
this regard the TDCA Agreement contends that “Where any product is being 
imported in such quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten 
to cause serious deterioration in the economic situation of one or more of the 
member countries of the Southern African Customs Union, South Africa, at the 
request of the country or countries concerned, and after having examined 
alternative solutions, may exceptionally take surveillance or safeguard 
measures in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 26”.191 Against 
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this background it can be observed that the BLNS are not able to apply for 
safeguards autonomously, but through South Africa, which seriously curtails 
their ability to safeguard their interests. 
The EU also envisaged that the BLNS would benefit from the so-called “full 
cumulation of origin”, which allows the latter to use inputs from any ACP country 
and export under the existing preferential market conditions to the EU. 
However, apart from using inputs from ACP countries, a related contentious 
issue within the negotiations of the TDCA has been that it was initially 
envisaged that the BLNS would be able to source inputs from South Africa and 
still export under preferential terms to the EU market.192 However, full 
cumulation within SACU (between BLNS and South Africa) has not taken place 
as this has required customs arrangements to be put in place on the part of 
South Africa, which would guarantee that the rules of origin are supervised.193 
In this regard the EU has noted that “this was not a subject to be dealt with 
under the agreement with South Africa; it belongs to Lomé.194 
In order to ensure a positive regional impact, the EU also launched an 
Economic Integration Support Programme (EISP) with a funding of €6 million, to 
help the BLNS deal with the introduction of free trade, in particular revising 
trade policies, undertaking impact studies and supporting the development of 
the private sectors in these countries.195  However, this funding had only been 
released in 2005, after a long dispute regarding “concurrence” of the BLNS to 
the TDCA.196 As South Africa and the BLNS are part of the same customs 
union, the need for the latter to “concur” to the TDCA is essential in order to 
preserve the legal quality of SACU and its CET.  
Therefore “concurrence” in this respect would refer to “official recognition of not 
being in a position to access indirect EU imports, it implies BLNS countries’ 
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unilateral acceptance of the TDCA liberalisation schedule”.197 In this instance 
the EU has made the release of these funds contingent on BLNS concurrence 
of the TDCA liberalisation schedule. This once again illustrates a certain degree 
of conditionality attached to aid preferences. Eventually, the EU had released 
these funds under the 9th EDF, arguing that the ratification of the 2002 SACU 
Agreement would imply concurrence to the TDCA liberalisation schedule on the 
part of the BLNS. As was indicated in chapter 2, although the new SACU 2002 
Agreement requires the consent of all members in regard to preferential trade 
arrangements, it contains a clause which exempts preferential trade 
agreements that predate this agreement, such as the TDCA.  
After having briefly examined the regional measures that have been taken on 
the part of South Africa and the EU in respect to compensating the BLNS in the 
context of the TDCA, two important points can be made, which have been a 
recurrent theme and have important implications for the EPA negotiations and 
the future of SACU. First, it is clear that the EU is unwilling to extend the same 
level of concessions to the BLNS and South Africa. Second, the regional 
measures undertaken on the part of EU to compensate the BLNS with respect 
to the TDCA contain a strong element of conditionality, which once again 
exemplifies the link between trade and aid.  
3.10 S ummary 
This first part of this chapter has considered the shift in the EU’s trade policy 
from non-reciprocal trade relations, towards the introduction of reciprocity in the 
context of the EPA negotiations, in part necessitated by the multilateral trading 
system. It was highlighted that the EU has cited the spectre of WTO 
compatibility as a reason for moving towards reciprocal trade relations under 
EPAs, without offering much flexibility in respect to the time frame and 
proportion of trade to be liberalised. In terms of alternatives to EPAs, it has 
been shown that these cover fewer products with stricter rules of origin, thereby 
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limiting the choice of ACP countries and making it unlikely that these would be 
chosen over the EPAs.   
An analysis of the requirements of securing a WTO-compatible basis in regard 
to the provisions of the EPAs as modalities for future trade co-operation, 
suggests that these move beyond the minimum required, to embrace “new 
generation” issues which were referred to as “WTO plus”. To this end, it was 
argued that there is a potential link between trade related assistance and 
conclusion of an EPA, thereby exemplifying a measure of conditionality and 
issue-linkage. Hence, it was suggested that the developmental dimension of the 
EPAs in the form of trade related assistance can be depicted as a political 
“sweetener” to gain concurrence on the part of ACP countries to the inclusion of 
“new generation” issues.  
The latter half of this chapter highlighted that South Africa has undertaken 
significant trade reform in line with its multilateral (WTO) and bilateral (TDCA) 
trade commitments, but has been unwilling to undertake further reform in other 
policy areas (i.e. competition policy), which have become increasingly important 
to the EU. This part also highlighted that the negotiation of the TDCA has had 
important implications for the BLNS, to which end, both the EU and South Africa 
had undertaken compensatory measures, which have served a purpose of 
gaining concurrence on the part of the BLNS to the TDCA liberalisation 
schedule, thereby once again exemplifying a potential link between trade 
related assistance and trade policy reform. This part also indicated that the EU 
has had a preference for differentiated tariff offers to South Africa on the one 
hand (under the TDCA), and the BLNS on the other (under Cotonou), which 
points to the fact that different rules of origin have to be maintained within 
SACU, thereby having important implications for its future.  
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C HAP T E R  4 E X AMINING  T HE  E P A NE G OT IAT ION P R OC E S S  
4.1 Introduc tion 
This chapter will examine the EPA negotiation process in light of the perceived 
costs and benefits associated with aligning both sets of rules of origin on the 
part of the EU and South Africa. It is assumed that the choices made by South 
Africa on the one hand, and the BLNS on the other, in terms of commitment to 
initial the interim EPA (IEPA) has been informed by a perceived cost/benefit 
analysis on the part of these actors. This part will also examine the extent to 
which the EU has been able to manipulate the opportunity costs of SACU 
members and the kind of leverage used to this end. In this regard, a game-
theoretic analysis is used to illustrate the strategic interaction between the EU 
and South Africa by showing how the choice of these actors is informed by their 
individual preferences. However, under certain restrictive conditions, which 
have increasingly appeared on the agenda of the EU as was shown in the 
preceding chapter, inter-alia, conditionality, issue-linkage and sanctioning, a 
game-theoretic approach is used to show how these can alter the order of 
preferences of the weaker actor and as a corollary have an impact on its choice 
in the negotiation process. As was indicated in chapter 1, this can force the 
weaker actor to make decisions within constraints, which will ultimately give 
greater preference to the more dominant actor within the negotiation process.  
4.2 R egional inc ons is tenc ies  in S outhern Afric a 
The replacement of the trade pillar of the Cotonou Agreement with new 
modalities for trade cooperation in the form of EPAs has necessitated ACP 
countries to enter negotiations with the EU on a regional basis. According to the 
EU, these are intended to enhance regional integration and help integrate these 
countries better in the world economy. However there is a growing consensus 
amongst ACP countries and NGOs that EPAs are divisive and are likely to have 
a major negative repercussion on regionalism within Southern Africa. The 
Southern Africa region which is negotiating EPAs with the EU has formed three 
groups. The first consists of 11 countries, namely, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
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Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar and 
Sudan, (the first five are all SADC countries) which are negotiating as part of 
the ESA EPA. The second is the TDCA with South Africa; the last group is the 
SADC EPA which is comprised of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, 
South Africa198, Angola and Mozambique (the first five are all SACU members, 
while all are SADC members).199 From the above it can be seen that SADC 
members are involved in multiple bilateral and regional trade arrangements 
which poses considerable challenges to regionalism in Southern Africa.  
As the liberalisation schedule of the ESA EPA and that of the SADC EPA are 
different, it means that neighbouring Southern Africa countries belonging to 
different groupings will have to implement different tariffs for EU imports, the 
effectiveness of which would depend on the enforcement of rules of origin. Most 
of the SADC countries within both groupings are signatories to the SADC Trade 
Protocol that envisages the implementation of tariff liberalisation schemes, 
which process will be weakened considering that each grouping will have to 
retain robust border controls on EU originating goods, where liberalisation 
schedules differ vis-à-vis the latter. Despite the launching of the SADC FTA in 
August 2008 as set out by the SADC Trade Protocol, the idea of fast-tracking 
this arrangement to a customs union by 2010 will make that impossible in light 
of the differing commitments vis-à-vis the EU.200    
4.3 R egional inc ons is tenc ies  in S AC U 
The situation for SACU is equally complicated as the BLNS are covered de 
facto, but not de jure by the TDCA and at the same time are members of the 
SADC EPA group, to which South Africa is not an official member.201  Therefore 
the most important question stemming from this has been over the alignment of 
the TDCA and the SADC EPA processes in order to ensure coherence within 
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SACU.202 In this regard, one of the key issues has been the extent to which the 
BLNS have been willing to accommodate the TDCA in the context of the SADC 
EPA negotiations.203 The reason for this is that as the EU requires reciprocity, 
the BLNS cannot offer further tariff concessions by virtue of SACU’s CET, which 
would require concurrence on the part of South Africa.204 It has been argued 
that if the BLNS were to negotiate the EPA on the basis of the TDCA, given that 
they would not be able to offer further market opening without the concurrence 
of South Africa, they would in de facto be incorporated in the market provisions 
of the TDCA, thereby loosing the preferential market access enjoyed under 
Cotonou.205 Such incorporation into the market provisions of the TDCA would 
impose duties on beef and beef products; fisheries; and sugar and sugar related 
products.206 It is estimated that this would affect Namibian and Swazi exports to 
the EU by over 50 percent and 82 percent respectively.207 This situation 
illustrates the fact that South Africa, by virtue of its membership in SACU and as 
the only signatory to the TDCA, has a central role to play in sorting out the 
BLNS EPA question by harmonising SACU’s position vis-à-vis the EU. The 
TDCA review and the EPA process have been seen as the only frameworks 
through which to address these inconsistencies.208  
However, in terms of the TDCA review, it was mentioned that neither the EU nor 
South Africa are too keen on reopening talks on liberalisation as this would 
require both sides to liberalise products which are partially excluded or fully 
excluded. It had been suggested that the rules of origin could also be 
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renegotiated within the TDCA review in order to implement a single SACU 
origin, but the European Commission has had a clear preference for 
differentiated tariff offers to the BLNS on the one part, and South Africa on the 
other part. It has made it clear that the SADC EPA negotiating members must 
receive better tariff concessions than South Africa.209 As SACU and the TDCA 
is limited to trade in goods only, whilst the EPA includes new generation issues, 
the extent to which the TDCA review can sort out this BLNS EPA situation 
remains questionable.210  
4.4 E xamining the negotiation proc es s  
Although the EC is insisting on treating South Africa differently, it has 
maintained that the latter should be more involved in the SADC EPA 
negotiations to ensure regional coherence. To this end, at a visit to the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) on 10 February 2006, 
Commissioner Mandelson indicated the need to “lock together consistently” the 
TDCA review and the SADC EPA negotiation.211 In this regard he proposed the 
need to expand the TDCA toward “a step change into services, investment and 
procurement – the hardwiring of dynamic, modern economies”.212  
In response, South Africa formulated a negotiating framework document 
together with the SADC EPA countries, through which it was formally included 
in the SADC EPA negotiations in February 2007.213 The framework document 
made a number of important points with relevance to SACU.214 First, it argued 
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that if the BLNS were to negotiate the EPA on the basis of the TDCA, their 
sensitivities should be taken into account. Second, it was highlighted that South 
Africa should receive DFQF market access alongside the other SADC EPA 
countries to ensure regional coherence. This option would have allowed South 
Africa to gain improved access for certain products which were not treated 
favourably under the TDCA.215 In return, South Africa would have reduced the 
TDCA tariff for EU goods on around 380 product lines; this is discussed further 
below. In this regard, South Africa has always argued that as it does not make 
differentiated tariff offers to separate EU states, the latter should also treat 
SACU in the same coherent manner. Third, in regards to new generation 
issues, the view of the EPA members has been that trade related assistance 
and capacity building should precede the negotiation of these issues, which in 
addition should be non-binding.  
The EC has responded that while it might consider addressing BLNS 
sensitivities under the TDCA review; these would not apply to South Africa.216 
As was mentioned, since January 2008, the EU has granted DFQF market 
access to all ACP countries with a qualification for rice and sugar, but this once 
again has excluded South Africa, “where a number of globally competitive 
products will continue to pay import duties”.217 With regards to differentiating 
amongst SACU members, in a meeting with the six SADC member ministers on 
4 March 2008, Commissioner Mandelson responded that South Africa should 
not try and use the EPA process as a means of pursuing its own interests at the 
expense of its SACU partners, but spoke of the need to “re-engage South Africa 
in the negotiations for a wider and deeper EPA”, through which it would be 
possible to find ways of increasing South Africa’s access into European 
markets.218 In other words, from the above it can be seen that the EU has 
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foreclosed the possibility of aligning market access provisions (between South 
Africa and the BLNS) under the TDCA review, but is willing to consider 
alternatives only in the context of the negotiation of a full EPA (on the part of 
South Africa). 
In addition to the obligation of having to negotiate the so called “new generation 
issues” under the EPA, the EC has also inserted a number of additional legal 
provisions in the interim text at the last moment, such as; the prohibition on the 
use of export taxes; a provision requiring free circulation of goods within the 
SADC EPA; removal of infant industry protection; and the inclusion of an MFN 
clause.219   
The elimination of export taxes has been a particular concern to Namibia and 
South Africa. The former has used these to prevent predatory trade practices in 
its market by South African companies, while the latter has argued that these go 
beyond what has been agreed under the TDCA and will serve to limit regional 
integration efforts.220 The provision relating to the promotion of the free 
movement of goods within the SADC EPA has been framed by the EC as a 
means of ensuring that EU goods entering the SADC EPA countries will pay 
customs duties only once. However it has been argued that this will serve to 
promote EU exports, by virtue of the fact that goods will be able to flow freely 
between trade entities with different tariff schedules or tariff phase-downs.221 
For instance, goods exported from the EU to Botswana can be re-exported 
duty-free to Mozambique (which is not part of SACU and has a different tariff 
phase down to the BLNS). Mozambique has also excluded a higher proportion 
of imports from the EU, while the exclusions of the BLNS are much smaller, as 
less than three years remain until the TDCA will be fully implemented (in 2012). 
Therefore the inclusion of such a clause could serve to limit the preferences 
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granted to countries that have excluded a higher proportion of imports or that 
are liberalising slower. The clause requiring removal of infant industry protection 
is also a contentious issue, which may limit the prospects for domestic 
industrialisation as local industries will be rendered less competitive relative to 
EU companies.  
Perhaps the most contentious of these additional provisions has been the MFN 
clause, which requires that the SADC EPA countries extend the EU the same 
treatment that may be offered to other major trading countries, which represent 
1 percent or more of world trade (such as the US, Japan, China and Brazil).222 
For the SADC EPA members and South Africa, the MFN clause is seen as 
placing significant limits on policy space by limiting the development of 
preferential South-South trade co-operation and effectively locking in the EU as 
the primary trading partner of the region.223 South Africa has been unable to 
agree, arguing that “this goes to the heart of our trade policy sovereignty, 
limiting our negotiating leverage and options”.224 
Despite the insertion of these provisions in the last moment, which have 
represented a red line for the EU, the SADC EPA members initialled the IEPA 
as the deadline of 31 December 2007 was approaching. Namibia initialled the 
IEPA on 12 December 2007, with a qualification of revisiting certain issues 
ahead of signing.225 South Africa however was unable to agree on these issues 
and has not initialled the agreement as of January 2009. Although several 
objections were raised by the SADC EPA countries at the same meeting with 
Commissioner Mandelson in March 2008, over the possibility of revisiting the 
MFN clause and the use of export taxes, Mandelson, foreclosed any such 
possibility by stating that “I am prepared to be flexible, on the basis that we 
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move forwards and not backwards”. He further added that “there is no way of 
re-opening the process that has already been negotiated”.226  
For countries like Namibia and Botswana which are major beef producers, it 
appears that under the EPA, these will continue to benefit from the beef 
commodity protocol, which permits guaranteed export quantities, with up to 92 
percent reduced duties.227  
As was pointed out earlier, if Namibia refuses to sign the EPA and as a 
consequence is downgraded to the less advantageous GSP, it would face up to 
142 percent higher tariffs. It is also worth noting that even though the EU 
absorbs almost the entire beef export capacity of these countries, these have 
been unable to fill their export quotas to the EU market.228 Therefore arguably 
perhaps, the demands of the ACP countries in seeking to build trading, supply 
and production capacity prior to negotiating EPA provisions, is not 
unreasonable. Notwithstanding, some SADC EPA countries like Botswana have 
perceived the provisions of EPAs positively, especially in regards to 
liberalisation of services, which is expected to result in increased investments in 
the diamond industry and more competition to South African companies 
operating in its economy.229  Arguably, the increase in competition resulting 
from market opening to EU companies will limit the ability of South African 
companies to exploit business opportunities through oligopolistic or predatory 
trade practices in the BLNS, thereby resulting in greater efficiency and price 
reductions for goods and services in these countries. 
From the above analysis, given that only four of the five SACU member states 
have initialled the IEPA which is expected to be signed and notified to the WTO 
in early-mid 2009; unwillingness on the part of South Africa to join the EPA will 
necessitate rigorous border checks and enforcement of the different rules of 
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origin within SACU, owing to different liberalisation schedules and market 
access provisions to the EU market. Given the unenforceability of the EPA in 
SACU, due to South Africa’s reluctance to sign, the BLNS can in de facto enact 
the EPA tariff rate as opposed to applying the TDCA tariff to EU imports 
entering SACU directly through their territories.230 According to Stevens, such a 
situation may persist indefinitely or may be ameliorated when the final tranche 
of liberalisation occurs under the TDCA (in 2012), which will align both tariff 
regimes closer together.231 
In an interview conducted as part of this research report at a SAIIA Conference 
on regional economic integration in Southern Africa on 25 November 2008, 
Xavier Carim (Deputy Director-General of the DTI), indicated that there are 
currently discrepancies on about 436 product lines between the TDCA and EPA 
tariffs, which could be reconciled either through unilateral opening on the part of 
South Africa to 380 of these product lines (South Africa to adjust the level of the 
TDCA tariff to that of the EPA), or for South Africa to implement border controls 
for these products.232 The remaining 54 product lines are treated more 
favourably under the TDCA than the EPA in line with addressing BLNS 
sensitivities and would therefore be a concern to the latter.233 As far as 
unilateral opening is concerned, this option would require South Africa to 
liberalise most product lines faster than required under the TDCA and opening 
up the remaining product lines which have not been negotiated under the latter 
agreement.234 This option would certainly preserve the regional coherence 
through the enforcement of the CET across SACU by not requiring South Africa 
to negotiate new generation issues under the EPA. However, this is considered 
unrealistic as it is self-evident that it may not be in South Africa’s interest, given 
that it will not gain anything in return. Therefore, the second option seems most 
probable, whereby South Africa will implement border controls due to the 
unenforceability of the CET across SACU, ultimately leading to its demise. 
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When considering the costs and benefits which South Africa faces in making a 
choice of joining the EPA with the BLNS, it has had to reconcile between 
various conflicting interests, such as its national economic interests, its wider 
regional role, meeting its stated commitment to South-South relations and the 
relationship with its most important trading partner, the EU.235 As was indicated 
in chapter 2, the size of the SACU CRP has steadily increased to ZAR 24.7 
billion in 2007/08, which has also resulted in a sustained increase in net fiscal 
transfers to the BLNS, costing South Africa about 1.1 percent of its GDP. In this 
context there have been speculations that if the BLNS sign the EPA with the EU 
in early-mid 2009, South Africa could use this opportunity to dismantle the 
customs union on the grounds of the unenforceability of a CET across SACU. 
Therefore, by not signing onto the EPA, South Africa can potentially dissolve 
the customs union and redirect these transfer payments away from the BLNS 
toward much needed domestic social expenditure for instance.  
By not signing, South Africa will also avoid opening up to competitive EU 
companies in the services sector, which would limit its ability to pursue its 
political imperatives, the most notable amongst which as noted were its 
employment creation and Black economic empowerment drive. Such choice will 
also allow South Africa to pursue South-South cooperation by avoiding the MFN 
clause under the EPA. This would be consistent with the proverbial “butterfly” 
strategy of the DTI, which seeks to prioritise South-South relations by extending 
its wings to East Asia and Latin America; and forming closer relations with 
African countries.236 On the flipside however, given that South Africa has 
assumed a position of leadership in lifting the continent from its position of 
exclusion in the world economy through various frameworks, amongst which is 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), dissolution of SACU 
will send a negative political message to Africa that it is not committed to 
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regional economic integration.237 Although South Africa does not perceive much 
benefit from its firms potentially entering the EU market under the EPA, it has 
been suggested that EU firms in the South African market will bring much 
needed competition to high-cost services in the fields of telecommunications, 
energy and transport sectors; thereby leading to greater efficiency and price 
reductions for goods and services.238 
The position of South Africa with regard to it having to reconcile between 
domestic politics and the trade negotiations with the EU at the international level 
is consistent with the model of Robert Putnam, which depicts the politics of 
trade negotiations to be operating at both the national level and at international 
level, which can be conceived as a “two-level game”.239 At a national level, 
domestic constituents seek to pressure government toward adopting favourable 
policies. On the international level, government will seek in meeting the 
demands of domestic constituents, while concurrently seeking to avoid 
imposing costs on foreign developments.240 The greater the consistency 
between the processes at both levels, the more likely agreement will be 
reached. In the case of South Africa, it appears that there have been grave 
inconsistencies between both levels. At the domestic level, narrow interest 
group goals coupled with the political power of trade unions have to a large 
extent informed the decisions made by government at the international level, in 
the context of the trade negotiations with the EU. As a result, at the international 
level, meeting domestic considerations has threatened to impose costs on the 
BLNS and the integrity of SACU, by virtue of South Africa’s unwillingness to join 
the EPA.  
4.5 G ame theory and the politic al ec onomy of the negotiations   
Figure 2 below, has reduced the choices faced by the EU and South Africa to a 
2X2 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game theory matrice, whereby each actor is 
                                            
237 Draper, P., et al., (2) op.Cit. 
238 Locit. 
239 Putnam, R., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” in 
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 432.  
240 Locit. 
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faced with a dichotomous choice. It has been illustrated that South Africa would 
seek to gain more favourable market access to the EU (by seeking alignment of 
the TDCA with the EPA), which would preserve the integrity of SACU without 
having to sign onto the EPA (Block B). Such improved market access to the EU 
market depicts the request of South Africa to be given DFQF market access to 
the EU market alongside the other SADC EPA countries. In turn, South Africa 
would have granted improved market access to the EU under the TDCA for 380 
product lines. Conversely, the EU would seek to make South Africa sign onto an 
EPA, without extending improved market access to the latter (Block C). As this 
model assumes that actors are self-seeking egoists, the rational pursuit of self-
interest will in theory lead to Pareto sub-optimal outcomes (Block D), whereby 
both actors end up being worse-off than if they had co-operated (through mutual 
policy co-ordination). This model assumes that both actors will gain more if they 
avoid the rational pursuit of self-interest by co-operating (arriving at Block A), 
but only under certain restrictive conditions, inter-alia, conditionality, issue-
linkage and sanctioning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F igure 2 G ame T heory P ayoff Matric e 
As was shown in the preceding chapter, the EU has had a clear preference of 
moving away from “entitlement aid” toward increased conditionality on aid 
 SOUTH AFRICA   
 
EXTENDS MORE 
FAVOURABLE MARKET 
ACCESS TO S.A. 
 
 
SIGNS ONTO EPA 
EXTENDS MORE 
FAVOURABLE MARKET 
ACCESS TO S.A. 
 
DOES NOT EXTEND MORE 
FAVOURABLE MARKET 
ACCESS TO S.A. 
 
DOES NOT EXTEND MORE 
FAVOURABLE MARKET 
ACCESS TO S.A. 
 
DOES NOT SIGN ONTO 
EPA 
DOES NOT SIGN ONTO 
EPA 
 
A B 
D 
SIGNS ONTO EPA 
 
C T HE  E  U 
79 
 
preferences as part of its broader approach of promoting development through 
trade rather than aid. To that end, given that EPAs are representative of this 
broader shift, it was shown how the EU has linked trade related assistance to 
the programming of the 10th EDF for instance, which exemplifies a measure of 
both conditionality and issue-linkage. The possibility of reneging on the part of 
ACP countries (i.e. the BLNS) in not signing onto the EPA would result in a loss 
of market access and aid preferences, which in this case serves as a form of 
sanctioning. In theory, these functions are performed by international regimes 
which increase the prospects for long-term cooperation by holding potential 
defectors in line and preventing defection for short-run gains, making it more 
likely that the choices of actors will converge in Block A. 
It is important to recall that theories of international regimes allow for a systemic 
level analysis by focusing on choice in explaining how actors’ preferences were 
brought into convergence within the negotiation process. As actors make 
choices in the context of constraints, these can be imposed by the more 
dominant actor through a manipulation of opportunity costs; which will ultimately 
force the weaker actor to make choices voluntarily within constraints that are 
mandated by the more dominant actor. In this context, reference was made to 
the concept of “asymmetrical interdependence”, which posits that any changes 
(which may be enacted by the more dominant actor) within the relationship 
between actors will be more costly to the weaker actor than to the more 
powerful actor.  
In this context it may be argued that the opportunity costs faced by the BLNS 
have been manipulated in such a way by the EU (through conditionality, issue-
linkage and sanctioning), that the perceived costs of not signing onto the EPA 
have appeared greater than the perceived benefits. This has in turn altered their 
preferences, leading to a point where the BLNS have accepted to sign the EPA 
“voluntarily”. As for South Africa, it can be argued that there has been 
insufficient threat on the part of the EU to trigger any systemic level changes, 
where South Africa would find it in its interest to “voluntarily” sign onto the EPA. 
As a result, the choices of the EU and South Africa have converged in Block D. 
This confirms the view that medium-sized countries like South Africa face 
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relatively lower opportunity costs than weaker countries that are in a much more 
vulnerable position, such as the BLNS. Although such game-theoretic 
approaches like Prisoner’s Dilemma are far too simple to capture all the 
important aspects of the trade negotiations between the EU and 
South/Southern Africa, these allow for a more restrictive and parsimonious 
analysis, by capturing the most important parameters of the negotiations, 
thereby exemplifying how problems of international cooperation can be resolved 
through conditionality, issue-linkage and sanctioning. 
81 
 
C ONC L US ION  
This research report aimed to examine the potential impact of the EU’s trade 
policy on the integrity of SACU. To this end, the differentiation on the part of the 
EU between the BLNS (under Cotonou) and South Africa (under the TDCA) has 
had considerable implications for SACU. An argument was made that the EU’s 
trade policy agenda has exhibited a significant degree of conditionality and 
issue-linkage between trade and aid, as a means for gaining political 
acceptance for trade policy reform. It was shown that the extent to which such 
policy has been successful has depended on its adversary’s relative size and 
level of economic development. As the relative opportunity costs faced by 
medium-sized states like South Africa have been much lower than those faced 
by smaller states such as the BLNS, respectively, the EU’s ability to gain 
concessions for trade policy reform on the part of South Africa has been 
relatively lower than in the case of the BLNS. Apart from relative size and level 
of economic development, it was also shown that opportunity costs can also be 
affected by the relative consistency between domestic and international affairs 
(the two-level game). 
In examining the impact of the EU’s trade policy on the integrity of SACU, this 
research report has consisted of four sections to substantiate this analysis. To 
this end, a method of process tracing was used to trace the cause-effect link 
which connects the independent, intervening and dependent variables.    
In formulating and specifying the variance in the dependent variable, Chapter 2 
provided insight into the essential characteristics and rationale of a customs 
union, which in the case of SACU has been characterised by extreme 
inequalities in relative size and level of economic development between 
member states. In this regard, throughout its history, it was shown that co-
operation between its members has been characterised more by the inter- as 
opposed to the intra-governmental nature of decision making, in part sustained 
by a trade off between on the one hand, South African policy dominance in 
determining the CET unilaterally and prior to the 1990s, a political dividend to 
maintain the geo-political status quo, and on the other hand, a generous share 
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of the revenue pool to the BLNS. These characteristics have had a profound 
impact on the ability of developing common negotiating strategies with third 
parties, which has threatened to undermine the legal quality of SACU and its 
CET, which has been its defining feature.  
Since the 1990s, these characteristics have been compounded by the shifts in 
the multilateral trading system toward greater liberalisation and trade openness, 
both directly and indirectly. The direct effect has been felt more by South Africa, 
while the indirect effect by the BLNS on a regional and international level, 
through; South Africa’s reduction of the CET and as a corollary, the reduction of 
the common revenue pool, which has been the main source of national income 
for these countries; and the shift toward greater openness in trade, services and 
other “new generation” issues on the part of the EU.  
As has been shown, the EU has been able to gain political acceptance on the 
part of Southern African countries in accepting greater openness in trade and 
“new generation” issues through increased conditionality, issue-linkage and 
sanctioning. However the extent to which these countries have been resilient to 
the demands of the EU has been dependent on their relative opportunity costs, 
which have been determined by their economic size and level of development. 
The argument was made that these can also be affected by the relative 
consistency between politics at the domestic and international level.  
In the case of South Africa, it was shown that developments at the national level 
have served to decrease its opportunity costs of undertaking changes at the 
international level, in the direction of joining the EPA alongside the BLNS by 
negotiating services and “new generation” issues, which have been so 
important to the EU. Therefore the relative inconsistency between both 
processes has informed South Africa’s order of preferences, which prioritises its 
own national policies and South-South relations, while arguably, according a 
more secondary role to regional economic integration. By contrast, the 
opportunity costs for the BLNS have increased as a direct consequence of the 
shift in the EU’s trade policy, thereby making it within their interest to accept 
greater trade openness and “new generation” issues. Testimony to this is the 
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fact that these countries have initialled the IEPA and have indicated their 
willingness to shortly sign this agreement, which is expected to take place in 
early-mid 2009. 
From the analysis it is clear that there has been insufficient political will on the 
part of both the EU and South Africa to resolve the impasse over the potential 
dissolution of SACU. Neither the EU is willing to make concessions in granting 
South Africa improved market access, nor is South Africa keen in joining the 
EPA. As was indicated, the perpetuation of this situation may engender the 
introduction of border controls, for both inbound goods destined to SACU from 
the EU, due to the unenforceability of the CET across SACU, and for outbound 
SACU goods destined for the EU, as the BLNS will export under more 
favourable terms under the EPA.  
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